Throughout the twentieth century, much of the population in Latin America lacked access to social protection. Since the 1990s, however, social policy for millions of outsiders - rural, informal, and unemployed workers and dependents - has been expanded dramatically. Social Policy Expansion in Latin America shows that the critical factors driving expansion are electoral competition for the vote of outsiders and social mobilization for policy change. The balance of partisan power and the involvement of social movements in policy design explain cross-national variation in policy models, in terms of benefit levels, coverage, and civil society participation in implementation. The book draws on in-depth case studies of policy making in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico over several administrations and across three policy areas: health care, pensions, and income support. Secondary case studies illustrate how the theory applies to other developing countries.

Unemployed and informal workers seem an unlikely source of large-scale collective action in Latin America. Since 1997, however, Argentina has witnessed an upsurge of protest and the emergence of unusually influential federations of unemployed and informal workers. To explain this puzzle, this article offers a policycentered argument. It suggests that a workfare program favored common interests and identities on the part of unemployed workers and grassroots associations, allowing them to overcome barriers to collective action. State responses to demands for workfare benefits generated a pattern of protest and negotiation that strengthened those groups and dramatically expanded social policy.Unemployed and informal workers seem an unlikely source of large-scale collective action in Latin America. 1 Lacking the work ties that have typically fostered common interests and identities, and marginalized by labor unions that have often seen in their large numbers a threat to the formal workforce, unemployed and informal workers have remained at the margins of major working-class organization and 301

Unexpected social policy expansion and progressive tax reforms initiated by right-wing governments in Latin America highlight the need for further theory development on the politics of redistribution. We focus on electoral competition for low-income voters in conjunction with the power of organized actors-both business and social movements. We argue that electoral competition motivates redistribution under left-wing and right-wing incumbents alike, although such initiatives are more modest when conservatives dominate and business is well-organized. Social mobilization drives more substantial redistribution by counterbalancing business power and focusing incumbents on securing social peace and surviving in office. By characterizing distinctive features of social-policy politics and tax-policy politics and theorizing linkages between the two realms, we contribute to broader debates on the relative influence of voters versus organized interests in policymaking. We apply our theory to explain "least-likely" cases of redistributive policies under conservative governments in Mexico (2006-2012) and Chile (2010-2014).! and Calderón (2006-2012) administrations in Mexico and the Piñera (2010-2014) administration in Chile enacted pro-poor social policies and tax increases targeting elites despite clear preferences for small government and close ties to business. Similar policy outcomes occurred under Uribe (2002-2010) in Colombia. Influential theories that focus on the role of left-party dominance, median-voter preferences, and/or resource abundance to explain equity-enhancing reforms do not adequately account for this phenomenon of redistribution under conservative incumbents, which could become more prevalent with a rise of the right looming on the horizon. This paper elaborates a theoretical framework for analyzing the politics of redistribution in highly unequal democracies that emphasizes the role of electoral competition for low-income voters in conjunction with the power of organized societal actors, including both business and social movements. We argue that electoral competition for low-income voters plays an important role in driving redistributive reforms under left-wing and right-wing incumbents alike, although initiatives tend to be more modest when conservatives dominate the government and business is well-organized. Social movement mobilization in turn drives redistributive initiatives that depart significantly from conservative governments' preferences, by counterbalancing business power and focusing incumbents on the imperatives of securing continuity in office and social peace. While in other studies we focus on social policy expansion (Garay 2016) or progressive taxation (Fairfield 2015a), this paper explicitly integrates both aspects of redistribution within a unified framework. We characterize distinctive features of politics in each policy realmelectoral competition and social movement pressures are generally most salient for social policy expansion, whereas business tends to dominate direct-tax politi...

No abstract

No abstract