Organizational and partisan brokerage of social benefits: Social policy linkages in Mexico

Garay, Candelaria; Palmer‐Rubin, Brian; Poertner, Mathias

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105103

Cited by 19 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…State-level programs are even more limited, and 69% of those combating poverty had less than 10,000 beneficiaries in 2014, at a time when more than 60 million people were poor (Cejudo et al, 2018). In both urban and rural areas, access to proyectos productivos and vivienda benefits, which are in short supply, many times occurs through the intermediation of organizations or partisan brokers (Castellanos-Navarrete & Jansen, 2017; Garay et al, 2019; Hilgers, 2008).…”

Section: Interest Organizations In Mexicomentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Palmer‐Rubin

Garay

Poertner

2020

Comparative Political Studies

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While the presence of a strong civil society is recognized as desirable for democracies, an important question is what motivates citizens to join organizations. This article presents novel experimental evidence on the conditions under which citizens join interest organizations. We presented 1,400 citizens in two Mexican states with fliers promoting a new local interest organization. These fliers contain one of four randomly selected recruitment appeals. We find evidence that both brokerage of state patronage and demand-making for local public goods are effective recruitment appeals. The effect for patronage brokerage is especially pronounced among respondents with prior organizational contact, supporting our hypothesis of a “particularistic socialization” effect wherein organizational experience is associated with greater response to selective material benefits. Our findings suggest that under some conditions, rather than generating norms of other-regarding, interest organizations can reinforce members’ individualistic tendencies.

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Section: Interest Organizations In Mexicomentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Palmer‐Rubin

Garay

Poertner

2020

Comparative Political Studies

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“…Conditional cash transfer programs, such as Mexico's PROSPERA (previously PROGRESA and Oportunidades) and Brazil's Bolsa Familia are the poster children for a wave in non-discretionary (formula-based) social spending (De La O 2015;Garay 2016). However, "demand-based" social programs and subsidies remain widespread in Mexico, particularly on the subnational level (Cejudo, Michel, and Sobrino 2017;Garay, Palmer-Rubin, and Poertner 2020;Rizzo 2019).…”

Section: Why Programmatic Organizations Mattermentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, patronage benefits are certainly amenable to clientelist politics, which aptly describes the dynamic for most organizations in the patronage trap. commonly negotiate with politicians for special treatment in the allocation of these benefits (Garay, Palmer-Rubin, and Poertner 2020). On the other hand, demand-making about distributive programs can be programmatic when it concerns the adoption of new programs or the modification of the formulas that formally govern allocation.…”

Section: Conceptualizing Programmatic and Patronage Representationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Thus, perhaps even a program-oriented state government may unwittingly find itself engaging organizations in patronage politics. The ample margin for patronage-based discretion in the allocation of distributive programs is an ongoing problem in Mexico (Cejudo and Zedillo Ortega 2015;Garay, Palmer-Rubin, and Poertner 2020). Perhaps the higher degree of patronage politics for peasant organizations is attributable to a more discretionary design for rural support programs.…”

Section: State: Policy Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evading the Patronage Trap

2018

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An electronic version of this book is freely available, thanks in part to the support of libraries working with Knowledge Unlatched (KU). KU is a collaborative initiative designed to make high quality books Open Access for the public good. More information about the initiative and links to the Open Access version can be found at www.knowledgeunlatched.org. The University of MichiganPress's open access publishing program is made possible thanks to additional funding from the University of Michigan Office of the Provost and the generous support of contributing libraries.

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“…Así mismo, existen referentes importantes en las democracias presidencialistas de Latinoamérica. En los últimos 30 años han aparecido trabajos sobre Argentina, México y Brasil que han incorporado variables como la representación política en el legislativo Sanguinetti, 1996;González, 2012;Murillo, 2004;González;Mamone, 2012;González;Mamone, 2015), la política social (Garay;Palmer-Rubin;Poertner, 2020) y la filiación partidista (Díaz-Cayeros;Estévez;Magaloni, 2016), los cuales han permitido avanzar en la comprensión del fenómeno de la política distributiva.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Más allá del clientelismo y la técnica: la <i>distribución política</i> del presupuesto gubernamental en Colombia

Leyva-Botero

Mejía-Betancur

Fortou

2021

Rev.CS

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En este artículo examinamos la distribución presupuestal por el ejecutivo central en un régimen presidencialista desde la literatura sobre la distribución táctica. Nuestro objetivo es evaluar empíricamente teorías existentes sobre la racionalidad política de este fenómeno. Iniciamos con una revisión de la literatura comparada, con énfasis en la distribución orientada hacia votantes y miembros del legislativo. Derivamos tres hipótesis que capturan tres modelos teóricos distintos: distribución técnica, distribución hacia votantes y distribución hacia el legislativo. Posteriormente, analizamos una base de datos original sobre la distribución de cupos indicativos presupuestales en Colombia durante el primer gobierno del presidente Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2014). Mediante un análisis de regresión, mostramos que los incrementos en el grado de representación en el congreso se asocian positivamente con el monto de las asignaciones presupuestales. Este hallazgo da soporte empírico a teorías sobre la política distributiva no programática orientada al legislativo.

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Organizational and partisan brokerage of social benefits: Social policy linkages in Mexico

Cited by 19 publications

References 33 publications

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Incentives for Organizational Participation: A Recruitment Experiment in Mexico

Evading the Patronage Trap

Más allá del clientelismo y la técnica: la <i>distribución política</i> del presupuesto gubernamental en Colombia

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