Militias, Ideology, and the State

Staniland, Paul

doi:10.1177/0022002715576749

Cited by 116 publications

(90 citation statements)

References 49 publications

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“…Fourth, a regime's ideology may influence the state's strategies toward militias. While ideologies emphasizing regime centralization, such as Marxism-Leninism, tend to facilitate collaboration with, and strict control of militias, more fragmented regimes tolerate the use of militias by political elites for parochial or private purposes (Staniland 2015). Finally, authoritarian regimes may create militias as a method of ''coup-proofing'' (De Bruin 2014, 3-4).…”

Section: Militias and Their Relation To The Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Militias in Civil Wars

Jentzsch

Kalyvas

Schubiger

2015

Journal of Conflict Resolution

202

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Militias are an empirical phenomenon that has been overlooked by current research on civil war. Yet, it is a phenomenon that is crucial for understanding political violence, civil war, post-conflict politics, and authoritarianism. Militias or paramilitaries are armed groups that operate alongside regular security forces or work independently of the state to shield the local population from insurgents. We review existing uses of the term, explore the range of empirical manifestations of militias, and highlight recent findings, including those supplied by the articles in this special issue. We focus on areas where the recognition of the importance of militias challenges and complements current theories of civil war. We conclude by introducing a research agenda advocating the integrated study of militias and rebel groups.

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Section: Militias and Their Relation To The Statementioning

confidence: 99%

Militias in Civil Wars

Jentzsch

Kalyvas

Schubiger

2015

Journal of Conflict Resolution

202

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“…While rebel groups, terrorist groups, or warlords represent illegitimate use of physical force, states also deliberately empower different types of armed actors that operate detached from their official armed forces (e.g. Carey, Colaresi & Mitchell, 2015;Jentzsch, Kalyvas & Schubiger, 2015;Staniland, 2015). Defining characteristics of pro-government militias are their separation from the official armed forces as distinctly organized armed groups and a more or less loose connection to the state, reflected in shared information, weapons, and monetary or organizational support (Carey, Mitchell & Lowe, 2013: 250).…”

Section: Delegating Violence To Pro-government Militiasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spoilers of peace: Pro-government militias as risk factors for conflict recurrence

Steinert

Carey

2018

Journal of Peace Research

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This study investigates how deployment of pro-government militias (PGMs) as counterinsurgents affects the risk of conflict recurrence. Militiamen derive material and non-material benefits from fighting in armed conflicts. Since these will likely have diminished after the conflict’s termination, militiamen develop a strong incentive to spoil post-conflict peace. Members of pro-government militias are particularly disadvantaged in post-conflict contexts compared to their role in the government’s counterinsurgency campaign. First, PGMs are usually not present in peace negotiations between rebels and governments. This reduces their commitment to peace agreements. Second, disarmament and reintegration programs tend to exclude PGMs, which lowers their expected and real benefits from peace. Third, PGMs might lose their advantage of pursuing personal interests while being protected by the government, as they become less essential during peacetimes. To empirically test whether conflicts with PGMs as counterinsurgents are more likely to break out again, we identify PGM counterinsurgent activities in conflict episodes between 1981 and 2007. We code whether the same PGM was active in a subsequent conflict between the same actors. Controlling for conflict types, which is associated with both the likelihood of deploying PGMs and the risk of conflict recurrence, we investigate our claims with propensity score matching, statistical simulation, and logistic regression models. The results support our expectation that conflicts in which pro-government militias were used as counterinsurgents are more likely to recur. Our study contributes to an improved understanding of the long-term consequences of employing PGMs as counterinsurgents and highlights the importance of considering non-state actors when crafting peace and evaluating the risk of renewed violence.

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“…In recent years, a growing body of literature has emerged on the fluid nature of militias, and non-state armed groups more broadly. Militias can for example transform into rebels, criminals, or even be incorporated in the state's security apparatus (Schneckener 2006, Staniland 2015, Dirkx and Terpstra 2016. Within the literature on non-state armed groups, studies on 'rebel governance' , and more recently 'militia governance' , analyse the interactions and relations of rebels and militias in civil wars with civilians and the state (Mampilly 2011, Arjona et al 2015, Gutiérrez-Sanín 2015.…”

Section: Multi-layered Governance and Militiasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Paradoxically, these groups of 'anti-rebels' are sometimes portrayed as a root cause of insecurity, while others see them as a vital part of local rule and state-building (Kalyvas 2006, p. 107). In some cases militias prey upon local populations, while other examples illustrate that militias provide governance services, or do both (Jentzsch et al 2015, Staniland 2015, Dirkx and Terpstra 2016. It is unclear however, how militia behaviour changes under the influence of external actors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Unintended Consequences of US Support on Militia Governance in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan

Dirkx

2017

Civil Wars

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How do militias use the external support provided to them by powerful foreign actors? In Kunduz province, Afghanistan, a wide range of militias have received money, weapons, training and political support through several US-funded militia programmes. While labelled as 'local self-defence forces' , the observable behaviour of these militias ranges from providing local governance services in the areas they control to preying upon the people they are supposed to guard. Through the analytical lens of multi-layered governance this article investigates how the external support of the United States has been adopted, manipulated, and/or diverted by local militias in Kunduz to serve their own agendas. While the militia support yielded short-term counterinsurgency gains, in the mid to long term, it has unintentionally undermined both the security needs of local populations in Kunduz and US strategic interests.

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Militias, Ideology, and the State

Cited by 116 publications

References 49 publications

Militias in Civil Wars

Militias in Civil Wars

Spoilers of peace: Pro-government militias as risk factors for conflict recurrence

The Unintended Consequences of US Support on Militia Governance in Kunduz Province, Afghanistan

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