Minimax Play at Wimbledon

Walker, Mark; Wooders, John

doi:10.1257/aer.91.5.1521

Cited by 306 publications

(212 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…4 Two recent papers that apply economic tools to sports strategy-and in doing so use sports data to test hypotheses about maximization-are the study of serves in tennis by Walker and Wooders (2001) and the study of penalty kicks in soccer by Chiappori, Levitt, and Groseclose (2002). In contrast to this paper, these papers find no evidence of large departures from optimal strategies.…”

Section: A Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 81%

Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football

Romer

2006

Journal of Political Economy

161

119

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This paper examines a single, narrow decision-the choice on fourth down in the National Football League between kicking and trying for a first down-as a case study of the standard view that competition in the goods, capital, and labor markets leads firms to make maximizing choices. Play-by-play data and dynamic programming are used to estimate the average payoffs to kicking and trying for a first down under different circumstances. Examination of actual decisions shows systematic, clear-cut, and overwhelmingly statistically significant departures from the decisions that would maximize teams' chances of winning. Possible reasons for the departures are considered.

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Section: A Frameworkmentioning

confidence: 81%

Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football

Romer

2006

Journal of Political Economy

161

119

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“…As Walker and Wooders (2001) have remarked in the context of other games with mixed strategy equilibria, games requiring unpredictable play are often easy to play, but difficult to play well. The Colonel Blotto game provides a good example.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games

et al. 2015

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A note on versions:The version presented here may differ from the published version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to consult the publisher's version. Please see the repository url above for details on accessing the published version and note that access may require a subscription.For more information, please contact eprints@nottingham.ac.uk AbstractWe investigate a version of the classic Colonel Blotto game in which individual battlefields may have different values. Two players allocate a fixed discrete budget across battlefields. Each battlefield is won by the player who allocates the most to that battlefield. The player who wins the battlefields with highest total value receives a constant winner payoff, while the other player receives a constant loser payoff. We focus on apex games, in which there is one large and several small battlefields. A player wins if he wins the large and any one small battlefield, or all the small battlefields. For each of the games we study, we compute an equilibrium and we show that certain properties of equilibrium play are the same in any equilibrium. In particular, the expected share of the budget allocated to the large battlefield exceeds its value relative to the total value of all battlefields, and with a high probability (exceeding 90% in our treatments) resources are spread over more battlefields than are needed to win the game. In a laboratory experiment, we find that strategies that spread resources widely are played frequently, consistent with equilibrium predictions. In the treatment where the asymmetry between battlefields is strongest, we also find that the large battlefield receives on average more than a proportional share of resources. In a control treatment, all battlefields have the same value and our findings are consistent with previous experimental findings on Colonel Blotto games.

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“…Duggan and Levitt (2002) study corruption by analyzing the performances of Japanese professional sumo wrestlers and find evidence that decisive matches are rigged and wrestlers exchange favours with each other. Chiappori, Levitt and Groceclose (2002) and Walker and Wooders (2001) analyze players' behaviours in using mixed strategies, respectively, in kicking penalties in soccer and in serving in tennis matches.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

Scoppa

2007

Empir Econ

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Minimax Play at Wimbledon

Cited by 306 publications

References 2 publications

Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football

Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Professional Football

Majoritarian Blotto contests with asymmetric battlefields: an experiment on apex games

Are subjective evaluations biased by social factors or connections? An econometric analysis of soccer referee decisions

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