Misdevelopments, Pathologies, and Normative Revolutions: Normative Reconstruction as Method of Critical Theory

Justice in education and recognitive justice

“…From this chapter, the conclusion is drawn that if recognitive justice is to be applied to explain educational inequality, further analysis should be conducted to clarify the distinction between the productive and destructive negative experiences infl uencing the learner's capacity for selfcultivation and transformation. 65 Th is requires more specifi ed conceptual clarifi cations between diff erent forms of misrecognition, ideological recognition, social pathologies and misdevelopments. 66 Th e second critical claim, advanced by Benner, is far more complicated than the fi rst.…”

The utopian shadow of normative reconstruction

“…Claiming that the approach “implies turning away from radical forms of critique and normative revolution,” he suggests that the turn to normative reconstruction in Freedom's Right departs from Honneth's earlier belief that “gradual progress constitutes only one way in which progress can take place” (Shaub, , p. 114). The verdict is therefore grim: any “defensible approach to Critical Theory has to be open to forms of radical critique and normative revolution,” and Honneth's intervention fails not only to retain such openness but also fails to “account for why abandoning [such ends] does not amount to a shortcoming” (Schaub, , p. 127). Fabian Freyenhagen echoes this concern, seeing in normative reconstruction a deep methodological shortcoming infecting Honneth's earlier writings as well and resulting ultimately in an “increasing reformism” in the development of his work (Freyenhagen, , p. 131).…”

“…Jörg Schaub frames this worry about normative reconstruction's potential conservativism in especially stark terms, arguing explicitly that the “method of normative reconstruction underlying Freedom's Right undermines Critical Theory's aspiration to be a force that is unreservedly critical and progressive” (, p. 107). Claiming that the approach “implies turning away from radical forms of critique and normative revolution,” he suggests that the turn to normative reconstruction in Freedom's Right departs from Honneth's earlier belief that “gradual progress constitutes only one way in which progress can take place” (Shaub, , p. 114). The verdict is therefore grim: any “defensible approach to Critical Theory has to be open to forms of radical critique and normative revolution,” and Honneth's intervention fails not only to retain such openness but also fails to “account for why abandoning [such ends] does not amount to a shortcoming” (Schaub, , p. 127).…”

Do reconhecimento recíproco à sociedade efetivamente social: considerações sobre a obra recente de Axel Honneth

“…Na trilha de Adam Smith, Émile Durkheim e John Dewey, ele atribui a estas esferas papéis fundamentalmente positivos, ainda que permanentemente ameaçados por desenvolvimentos patológicos. Esta perspectiva, porém, motiva seus críticos a afirmarem que na reconstrução dos princípios normativos da modernidade, particularmente da economia de mercado, ele teria se afastado do comprometimento crítico com a transformação da ordem social existente (Freyenhagen, 2015;Schaub, 2015). É em resposta a estas objeções que Honneth formula um estudo complementar a O direito da liberdade.…”