Misinformation in a riot: a two-step flow view

Abstract

Purpose Misinformation can have lasting impacts in the management and control of a public emergency. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate how misinformation flows and how user characteristics can shape such flows in the context of a violent riot in Singapore. Design/methodology/approach The authors apply the two-step flow theory and discuss the mixed methods approach involving wrangling Twitter data and descriptive analysis to develop and analyse two corpuses of misinformation related to the riot. Findings The findings are mostly consistent with the two-step flow theory, in that misinformation flows to the masses from opinion leaders (as indicated by higher measures such as online social influence and followers/following ratio). In the presence of misinformation, tweets opposing such misinformation may not always come from opinion leaders. Practical implications The authors work furthers knowledge about how misinformation goes viral, which provides practical implications to help policymakers and scholars in understanding and managing the dynamics and pitfalls of misinformation during an emergency. Originality/value This paper tackles the problem of misinformation in public emergencies using a mixed methods approach and contributes to ongoing theoretical work on managing online misinformation especially in public emergencies and crises.

Taking the lead in misinformation-related conversations in social media networks during a mass shooting crisis

“…This four-stage rumor interaction process suggests, like other previous research (e.g. Pang and Ng, 2017), the virality of misinformation can be contingent upon the influences of users on social media platforms. Such importance of communicating actors is further supported by Qin et al (2015, p. 369) who suggest that "the individual's social influence" is a decisive factor for social media INTR 33,2 users to decide whether to spread or stop spreading misinformation, along with other factors such as "the opinion environment" and "the cost to confirm the information."…”

The presumed influence of digital misinformation: examining US public’s support for governmental restrictions versus corrective action in the COVID-19 pandemic

“…Meanwhile, concerns over misinformation prevail in the field of digital information and communication (e.g. Cheng and Lee, 2019; Liu and Huang, 2020; Pang and Ng, 2017; Walter and Tukachinsky, 2020). Several scholars conducted research to analyze its diffusion process (Allcott et al , 2019), impact on perceptions of vaccines (Bode and Vraga, 2015) and climate change (Dixon et al , 2017), continued influence of misinformation encountering correction (Walter and Tukachinsky, 2020) and its perceived negative impact on self and others in political elections (Jang and Kim, 2018).…”

An Investigation of Misinformation Harms Related to Social Media during Two Humanitarian Crises

“…Misinformation is incorrect information which can seem to be legitimate initially (Holdeman 2018 ) but can mislead and create harmful effects to the individual and the community (Pang and Ng 2017 ). Love et al ( 2020 ) have identified that misinformation propagation can deepen harmful or deadly effects on people.…”

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