Missing the point or missing the norms? Epistemological norms as predictors of students’ ability to identify fallacious arguments

Weinstock, Michael; Neuman, Yair; Tabak, Iris

doi:10.1016/s0361-476x(03)00024-9

Cited by 74 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…9 sec. 3) notes, if metacognition had evolved for purposes of cognitive control we would expect people to have good native capacities to control, troubleshoot, and improve their own reasoning process. But we seem to have very poor natural competence in evaluating and reasoning about our own reasoning (Bos et al 2008;Moshman 2004;Pillow 2002;Weinstock et al 2004). Furthermore there are proposals, like the one presented by Carruthers that show that there is no need to appeal to metacognition and that mindreading abilities suffice for explaining the empirical data on reflective thinking (ch.…”

Section: The Relation Between Metacognition and Mindreadingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Sebastián

2016

THEORIA

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Many have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order-Representationalist (HOR) theories attempt to explain such self-awareness by means of higher-order representation. Consciousness depends on our capacity to represent our own mental states: our Theory of Mind. It is generally agreed that such an ability can be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.Keywords: Consciousness, Self-awareness, Higher-Order Theories, Theory of Mind, Mindreading, Metacognition.RESUMEN: Muchos han argumentado que la diferencia entre estados fenoménicamente conscientes y otros tipos de estados reside en la auto-conciencia implícita que muchos estados conscientes poseen. Las Teorías de la Representación de Orden Superior (HOR) pretenden explicar esa auto-conciencia mediante representaciones de orden superior. La conciencia depende de nuestra capacidad de representar nuestros propios estados mentales: nuestra Teoría de la Mente. Se acepta en general que esta capacidad puede descomponerse en otras dos: la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Argumentaré que la conciencia no puede depender de la lectura de mentes. La sostenibilidad de las teorías HOR depende, por tanto, de la relación entre la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Analizo algunas concepciones de esa relación y argumento que ninguna de ellas parece ser una opción plausible para las teorías HOR.Palabras clave: conciencia, auto-conciencia, teorías de orden superior, teoría de la mente, lectura de mentes, meta-cognición.

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Section: The Relation Between Metacognition and Mindreadingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Sebastián

2016

THEORIA

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“…For example, when scientific issues are discussed, citizens need to be able to sort out well-founded claims from less-well-founded claims. K-12 students (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001;Weinstock, Neuman, & Tabak, 2004) and adults (D. Kuhn, 1991) often struggle to evaluate arguments, in part due to poor ability to evaluate the credibility of evidence (Bråten et al, 2011;Nicolaidou et al, 2011).…”

Section: Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…A well-founded argument is one that performs this function well, within the framework of generally accepted rhetorical principles. Being able to distinguish between strong and weak arguments relies in part on sophisticated epistemological understanding (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001;Weinstock et al, 2004), which refers to how one thinks that knowledge is established and justified (Mason & Scirica, 2006). This is described in more detail in the next section.…”

Section: Argumentationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…With sophisticated epistemic beliefs, an individual knows that claims need to be supported with well-justified, converging evidence, such as evidence collected through tests of a refutable question Hogan & Maglienti, 2001;Mason & Scirica, 2006;Weinstock et al, 2004). Next, with sophisticated epistemic beliefs, one understands that justification for knowledge claims should come from rational arguments or empirical evidence, rather than an appeal to authority (Hogan & Maglienti, 2001;Jiménez-Aleixandre, 2014).…”

Section: Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Someone with sophisticated epistemic beliefs will also understand that most knowledge is not certain, and rather is subject to verification through further research (Hofer & Pintrich, 1997). Without sophisticated epistemic beliefs, individuals often jump to erroneous conclusions (Hofer, 2001;Weinstock et al, 2004). Epistemic beliefs influence individuals' ability to interpret conflicting information from multiple scientific texts (Bråten et al, 2011).…”

Section: Epistemologymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Intended Learning Outcomes and Assessment of Computer-Based Scaffolding

Belland

2016

Instructional Scaffolding in STEM Education

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In this chapter, I describe the intended learning outcomes of scaffolding-content knowledge and higher-order thinking abilities-and link these to the goals advanced by the Next Generation Science Standards and related documents from recent curricular revisions in STEM education. Furthermore, I address different ways in which scaffolding's effect can be measured (assessment level), and explore whether there are differences in the magnitude of scaffolding's effect according to assessment level. Meta-analysis results show that there is no difference in effect size magnitude on the basis of intended learning outcome (i.e., content knowledge or higher-order thinking abilities). Scaffolding's effect was greater when measured at the principles level than when measured at the concept level. But scaffolding's effect was statistically greater than 0 and substantial for all three assessment levels (i.e., concept, principles, and application). These results are then discussed.

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The Second Decade: What Develops (and How)

Kuhn

Franklin

2007

Handbook of Child Psychology

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Missing the point or missing the norms? Epistemological norms as predictors of students’ ability to identify fallacious arguments

Cited by 74 publications

References 19 publications

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?

Intended Learning Outcomes and Assessment of Computer-Based Scaffolding

The Second Decade: What Develops (and How)

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