Model–Based Testing of Cryptographic Protocols

Abstract

Abstract. Modeling is a popular way of representing the behavior of a system. A very useful type of model in computing is an abstract state machine which describes transitions over first order structures. The general purpose model-based testing tool SpecExplorer (used within Microsoft, also available externally) uses such a model, written in AsmL or Spec#, to perform a search that checks that all reachable states of the model are safe, and also to check conformance of an arbitrary .NET implementation to the model. Spec Explorer provides a variety of ways to cut down the state space of the model, for instance by finitizing parameter domains or by providing predicate abstraction. It has already found subtle bugs in production software. First order structures and abstract state machines over them are also a useful way to think about cryptographic protocols, since models formulated in these terms arise by natural abstraction from computational cryptography. In this paper we explain this abstraction process, 'experiments as structures', and argue for its faithfulness. We show how the Dolev-Yao intruder model fits into SpecExplorer. In a word, the actions of the DolevYao intruder are the 'controllable' actions of the testing framework, whereas the actions of protocol participants are the 'observable' actions of the model. The unsafe states are the states violating say Lowe's security guarantees. Under this view, the general purpose software testing tool quickly finds known attacks, such as Lowe's attack on the NeedhamSchroeder protocol.

Model-based Security Testing Using UMLsec

“…Despite the title, the paper [17] is not really about model-based testing of cryptographic protocols in our usage of the term "model-based testing" (i.e., generate test-sequences from models) but rather about soundness and completeness of symbolic models of cryptographic protocols with respect to computational complexity models, and about using the SpecExplorer for model-checking Spec-sharp models of cryptographic protocols. The approach proposed in [15] deals with the problem of establishing whether or not a security property expressed using an observer formalised as an input/output labelled transition system (IOLTS) holds in an IOLTS providing a black-box specification of the system.…”

Threats Identification and their Solution in Inter-Basestation Dynamic Resource Sharing IEEE-802.22

“…Nonce can be generated in many ways but for the proposed solution pseudo random nonce is recommended so that nonce for upcoming packets cannot be predicted. Nonce generation is a separate research issue and is explained in [9].…”

The work of Dean Rosenzweig

“…Rosenzweig, Runje, and Schulte explained this abstraction process, 'experiments as structures', and argued for its faithfulness in [16]. They showed how the Dolev-Yao intruder model fits into Spec Explorer.…”

“…Here we highlight Professor Rosenzweig's contributions to modeling, analysis, and testing of network security protocols [14] - [16], and his work on information technology used in the Zagreb Stock Exchange. His work on program specification and verification, evolving algebras, and abstract state machines [1]- [13] and [17]- [19] is described in eloquent tributes by Egon Börger [20] and Yuri Gurevich [21].…”