2011
DOI: 10.1017/s1816383112000197
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Monitoring armed non-state actor compliance with humanitarian norms: a look at international mechanisms and the Geneva Call Deed of Commitment

Abstract: Armed non-state actors are involved in most armed conflicts today, yet international law provides few mechanisms to ensure that they comply with humanitarian norms applicable to them. In particular, monitoring and verification mechanisms that address the conduct of armed non-state actors rarely appear in multilateral treaties, and, even when they do, are weak and not applied in practice. Over the past few years, a number of alternative mechanisms have been developed to better monitor respect of humanitarian no… Show more

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Cited by 49 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…By 2019, Geneva Call had signed 65 deeds of commitment with nonstate armed groups in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, with 54 of these banning totally the use of antipersonnel mines and committing to cooperation on mine action (Geneva Call 2020). Bongard and Somer (2011) found that compliance with these agreements has been good. Only one case revealed conclusive evidence of violation of the prohibition on the use, production, acquisition and transfer of antipersonnel mines.…”
Section: Self-incapacitation In Asymmetric Warfarementioning
confidence: 85%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…By 2019, Geneva Call had signed 65 deeds of commitment with nonstate armed groups in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, with 54 of these banning totally the use of antipersonnel mines and committing to cooperation on mine action (Geneva Call 2020). Bongard and Somer (2011) found that compliance with these agreements has been good. Only one case revealed conclusive evidence of violation of the prohibition on the use, production, acquisition and transfer of antipersonnel mines.…”
Section: Self-incapacitation In Asymmetric Warfarementioning
confidence: 85%
“…The symbolism here is about Geneva Call's work as a remedy to the deficiency in international humanitarian law that enforcement mechanisms and implementation obligations rest in the hands of states. Bongard and Somer (2011) concluded that signatory nonstate armed groups have been quite responsive to investigations of allegations of noncompliance with deeds of commitment, conducting their own investigations, allowing field visits by third-party monitors and agreeing to recommendations of third-party investigations for coming into compliance. The argument of this chapter as to why nonstate armed groups would do this is that they seek to build international legitimacy if and when the time comes for a diplomacy of negotiated resolution of their grievances or an end to their war.…”
Section: Self-incapacitation In Asymmetric Warfarementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Most conflicts today are fought against armed non-state actors, i.e., terrorist groups, insurgencies, and criminal organizations. 1 The international community is limited in policing non-state actors’ actions (Bongard and Somer 2011 ). This further complicates security situations: state actions are monitored and constrained, but non-state actors are not.…”
Section: When International Law Challenges Security and Identity Assu...mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…74 While there is no guarantee that deeds of commitment will be complied with, it is notable that Geneva Call has rarely encountered non-compliance in its work. 75 Armed groups are also being encouraged to create internal regulations in the form of codes of conduct defining the type of behaviour that the leadership expects from its members. 76 Although these efforts have borne fruit, sometimes when an armed group adopts humanitarian norms, the integrity of the norms are lost during the internalisation process.…”
Section: Towards An Accountability Of Armed Groups?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…https://www.icrc.org/en/document/conflict-disaster-crisis-UN-redcross-issue-warning. Accessed 29 June 2017; see alsoUN Security Council (2016a), paras 3, 4 and 9.3 See for example Zegveld 2002; Sivakumaran 2012; Murray 2016; Fortin 2017.4 See for exampleBangerter 2011Bangerter , 2015Bellal and Casey-Maslen 2011;Bongard and Somer 2011, Heffes andKotlik 2014;Sassòli 2010; Sivakumaran 2015. 158 K. Fortin…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%