Monopoly and the problem of the economists

Abstract

By any measure economists have played increasingly prominent roles in antitrust policy making, at least since the early 1970s. Indeed, the approach to the analysis of public policy toward business pioneered by Chicago school economists dominates the academic literature nowadays. According to the Chicago school's adherents, their insistence that antitrust be examined through the lens of price theory should have produced discernably ‘better’ (read pro‐consumer) laws and ‘better’ law enforcement. This paper contends that economists have in fact not had a positive influence on antitrust policy, but have instead actively contributed to its use as a way of subverting competitive market forces.

Antitrust public choice(s)

“…Besides its refusal to model policymakers, judges and-for that matter-economists (Shughart 1996) as disinterested maximizers of some nebulous social utility function, 1 public choice theory also calls into question the assumptions of perfectly informed public decision makers. To that end, Justice Breyer's concernregarding the ability of judges to properly assess the economic circumstances of each case that is brought to court-could be taken beyond what was clearly his intent, namely to suggest that neither the courts nor government antitrust agencies are equipped unambiguously to act in a manner that reduces the "deadweight loss" of certain business practices and, thus, increases overall welfare in society.…”