Moral fictionalism versus the rest

Nolan, Daniel; Restall, Greg; West, Caroline

doi:10.1080/00048400500191917

Cited by 67 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…(Imagine four quadrants divided by two axes. Perceivers within the cluster would be located in the upper 51 See also Nolan et al (2005). 52 I initially proposed that the base discourse consist of the opponent-process theory, but this approach did not yield correctness conditions.…”

Section: Color Fictionalism To the Rescuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Individual Variability Problem

Gatzia

2010

Philosophia

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Studies show that there are widespread intrasubjective and intersubjective color variations among normal perceivers. These variations have serious ramifications in the debate about the nature and ontology of color. It is typical to think of the debate about color as a dispute between objectivists and subjectivists. Objectivists hold that colors are perceiver-independent physical properties of objects while subjectivists hold that they are either projections onto external objects or dispositions objects have to look colored. I argue that individual color variations present difficulties, albeit not the same kind, for both objectivism and subjectivism. Lastly, I propose an alternative account that handles such variations nicely.

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Section: Color Fictionalism To the Rescuementioning

confidence: 99%

The Individual Variability Problem

Gatzia

2010

Philosophia

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“…4 Es handelt sich hier um revolutionäre Fiktionalisten, vgl. Joyce (2001Joyce ( , 2005 sowie Nolan et al (2005). 5 Hier handelt es sich um hermeneutische Fiktionalisten, vgl.…”

Section: Zielbestimmungunclassified

Moralische Wahrheit als stabile gerechtfertigte Behauptbarkeit

Tarkian¹

2008

Z Philosoph Forsch

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“…The consequences of normative error theories for the erroneous discourse are discussed inLillehammer 2004, Nolan, Restall, and West 2005Garner 2007, Eklund 2011, Köhler and Ridge (2013.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic

Andrić

2015

Acta Anal

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Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical (rather than theoretical) in the sense that they concern actions (rather than beliefs), and they are deontic (rather than evaluative) in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations (rather than about goodness, badness, and so on). This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the truth of some substantive evaluative judgements would not be threatened by the fact that no substantive practical deontic judgment is true. Secondly, in light of the truth of these evaluative judgements, the best thing we could do is to continue to make practical deontic judgements despite the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements. My third contention is that, if some evaluative judgements are unaffected by an error theory about practical deontic judgements, then such an error theory will eventually lead us to some version of consequentialism.Keywords Moral error theory . Deontic morality . Values . Consequentialism . Ishtiyaque Haji Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical (rather than theoretical) in the sense that they concern actions (rather than beliefs), and they are deontic (rather than evaluative) in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations (rather than about goodness, badness, and so on). This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that the truth of some substantive evaluative judgements is not threatened by the assumption that no Acta Anal

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Moral fictionalism versus the rest

Cited by 67 publications

References 18 publications

The Individual Variability Problem

The Individual Variability Problem

Moralische Wahrheit als stabile gerechtfertigte Behauptbarkeit

The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic

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