To solve the financing problem of the food producers, we consider a two-echelon contract food supply chain composed of a family farm with capital constraints and a food processing enterprise. With no capital constraints as the benchmark model, we analyze optimal decisions of the family farm and the food processing enterprise in the case of bank financing with bank participation only and bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation. Then, we discuss how the risk of yield uncertainty influences the optimal decisions and profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise under different financing situation. Meanwhile, the reason why the government subsidizes agriculture is explored, and the policy of minimum purchase price of the food is initiated when the market price is too low. Finally, the numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented. The results show that the bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation improves the welfare of supply chain members more obviously than the bank financing with bank participation only; when the rice price is too low, the policy of minimum purchase price of food is initiated, which increases the revenue and the growing enthusiasm of the family farm; the profits of the family farm and the food processing enterprise will decrease as the risk of yield uncertainty increases in the case of bank financing, and the risk of yield uncertainty will be reduced for the family farm when bank financing with “government, bank, and insurance” coparticipation.