Nash bargaining and partial privatization in mixed oligopoly

Nakamura, Tamotsu; Takami, Hiroyuki

doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2014.12.026

Cited by 9 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Nakamura and Takami [25] and many more). The second category includes studies where privatization is further classified into two parts: privatization as a discrete variable (See Anderson et al [3], Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon [5].)…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Paul,

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We analyze a mixed duopoly market with a public and a private firm competing in the downstream market. The public firm is partially privatized and a regulator decides on the privatization level to maximize welfare. A foreign monopolist supplies a key input for producing the final commodity, and may use uniform or discriminatory pricing; we observe the presence of a foreign monopolist that practices price discrimination can lead to the privatization of a public firm. The overall findings show, that under uniform pricing, Cournot competition leads to higher privatization levels, while under discriminatory pricing, Bertrand competition leads to higher privatization levels. The sensitivity of Cournot-Bertrand rankings to substitutability depends on the pricing regime. JEL classification code: D4, D6, H4, L1,L2

show abstract

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 98%

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Paul,

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The greater the X‐efficiency gains from privatization, the more likely that the post‐privatization cost will decrease. Nakamura and Takami (2015) prove that partial privatization is optimal if the privatization strategy is determined by Nash negotiation between the private and state‐owned sectors. However, the optimal degree of privatization with bargaining is lower than that without negotiation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal nationalization policy in a heterogeneous mixed oligopoly

Chen

Sun

et al. 2022

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study constructs a mixed oligopoly model considering product differentiation, the proportion of state‐owned shares, the efficiency gap, and the reform cost, investigates market equilibrium under different competition modes, and discusses the optimal proportion of state‐owned shares. Product differentiation, the proportion of state‐owned shares, and reform costs have complex impacts on the equilibrium results. Complete, partial, and no nationalization may be optimal under certain conditions. The competition mode affects welfare distribution among stakeholders. The government should decide on an optimal nationalization policy according to specific conditions and the market environment.

show abstract

“…Following the contribution of Matsumura (1998), some works on mixed markets endogenize the degree of privatization in order to focus on the relationship between partial privatization and different aspects both in Cournot and Bertrand settings. Examples in a Cournot setting are Matsumura and Kanda (2005) analyzing the influence of free entry, Fujiwara (2007) deals with the effects on product variety, Matsumura and Shimizu (2010) studies sequential privatization, Han and Ogawa (2012) consider the effects on advertising expenditures, and Nakamura and Takami (2015) consider that the strategies of a privatized firm are determined through bargaining between the private sector and the public sector. On the other hand, examples in a Bertrand setting are Isibashi and Kaneko (2008), who study quality competition, Xu et al (2016), who compare emission taxes and privatization policies, and Tomaru and Wang (2018), Wang and Chiou (2018), and Choi (2019), who consider the role of lower efficiency in the public firm.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Partial privatization with endogenous choice of strategic variable

Méndez-Naya

Novo-Peteiro

2022

Manage Decis Econ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This paper analyzes the optimal privatization policy when firms endogenously choose their strategic variable. The level of privatization is shown to determine: (i) the choice of strategic variable, whereby an asymmetric equilibrium could emerge (either Cournot–Bertrand or Bertrand–Cournot); (ii) the stability of equilibrium when the partially privatized firm and the private firm choose quantity and price respectively as the strategic variable; and (iii) the level of welfare, whereby Cournot–Cournot and Bertrand–Cournot games could lead to a greater welfare than the Bertrand–Bertrand model.

show abstract

Nash bargaining and partial privatization in mixed oligopoly

Cited by 9 publications

References 19 publications

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Reversal of Bertrand-Cournot Ranking for Optimal Privatization Level

Optimal nationalization policy in a heterogeneous mixed oligopoly

Partial privatization with endogenous choice of strategic variable

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About