Negotiation arithmetic: adding and subtracting issues and parties

Abstract

Students of international negotiations often examine strategic interactions among a given set of parties dealing with a specified group of issues. The issues and parties themselves are often choice variables whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on a bargain's outcome. Using a variety of international cases, I investigate the properties of several classes of moves that are intended to alter the issues and parties of an original negotiation. A unified approach to the analysis of such situations suggests numerous distinct means by which the “addition” or “subtraction” of issues can yield one-sided gains to the use of power; can yield joint gains that create or enhance a zone of possible agreement; and can reduce or destroy a zone of possible agreement. The effects of adding or subtracting parties are similarly analyzed. However, unintended complexity, unforeseen interrelationships, organizational considerations, transactions costs, and informational requirements may alter the analysis of such moves.

Optimal agendas for multi-issue negotiation

“…In the context of the SQP, [1] takes the set of issues to be negotiated as given and provides an analysis of the role of information and time preferences on the equilibrium, while [4,5] has dealt with taking the set of issues to be negotiated as given and finding an optimal ordering for the given set. But as the example outlined in the Introduction illustrates, the set of issues to be negotiated themselves are often choice variables (i.e., what issues to negotiate can be chosen by a negotiator) whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on the negotiation outcome [14]. Thus, a negotiator must make three key choices: he/she must decide the following:…”

“…The term agenda refers to the set of issues included for negotiation [11]. The agenda is important because, irrespective of the procedure, the outcome of negotiation depends on the agenda [7,14]. Thus, given the utility maximizing feature of agents, it is important to find what agenda maximizes their utility and is therefore optimal for them.…”

“…But as the above example illustrates, the set of issues to be negotiated themselves are often choice variables (i.e., what issues to negotiate can be chosen by a negotiator) whose ultimate configuration can have decisive effects on the negotiation outcome [14]. Thus, in addition to knowing what procedure is best for an agent, it is important to know what agenda maximizes an agent's utility and is therefore its optimal agenda.…”

Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen

“…Aber auch dann wäre eine Annäherung an die Wohlfahrtseffekte des Coase-Theorems noch möglich, wenn separate Projekte mit komplementären Kosten-Nutzen-Bilanzen zu komplexen Verhandlungspaketen kom--biniert werden können, durch die eine im ganzen ausgeglichene Interessenbilanz erreicht wird (Scharpf 1992). Dementsprechend wird sowohl in den internationalen Beziehungen wie in der Innenpolitik die Bedeutung von "issue-linkage" und "log-rolling" als Strategie zur Überwindung von Verhandlungsblockaden seit langem anerkannt (Haas 1980;Stein 1980;Sebenius 1983;MacGinnis 1986;Weingast 1989). …”

Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations

“…In some cases negotiation tie-in can facilitate multilateral cooperation by limiting the set of the feasible objections to joint cooperation arrangements. However, in other cases, rather than inducing parties to trade across issues, a tie-in restriction can actually constitute an obstacle to multilateral cooperation, as it removes 1 The point was¯rst stressed by Rai®a (1982) and Sebenius (1983). For a recent application to North-South trade and environmental policy cooperation, see Abrego et al (1997).…”