New Contributions to the Philosophy of History

Abstract

This Book Series is devoted to examining and solving the major methodological problems social sciences are facing. Take for example the gap between empirical and theoretical research, the explanatory power of models, the relevance of multilevel analysis, the weakness of cumulative knowledge, the role of ordinary knowledge in the research process, or the place which should be reserved to "time, change and history" when explaining social facts. These problems are well known and yet they are seldom treated in depth in scientific literature because of their general nature. So that these problems may be examined and solutions found, the series prompts and fosters the setting-up of international multidisciplinary research teams, and it is work by these teams that appears in the Book Series. The series can also host books produced by a single author which follow the same objectives. Proposals for manuscripts and plans for collective books will be carefully examined.The epistemological scope of these methodological problems is obvious and resorting to Philosophy of Science becomes a necessity. The main objective of the Series remains however the methodological solutions that can be applied to the problems in hand. Therefore the books of the Series are closely connected to the research practices.For further volumes:

Probability and Social Science

“…The approach to causality by various philosophers of science (Railton 1978 ;Salmon 1984 ;Franck 1994Franck , 2002Bechtel and Richardson 1993 ;Craver 2007 ;Darden 2002Darden , 2006Glennan 2002Glennan , 2005Little 2010 ; working in close cooperation with scientists offers another answer to the question-thanks to the notion of 'mechanism' or underlying process. First used in discussing machines, the notion was rapidly adopted in the seventeenth century for describing more complex systems such as cells and biological processes.…”

Introduction: Points of Contact Between Biology and History

“…On Bunge's theory of mechanisms and mechanismic explanation, see his 1997 and 2004) However, in order to reject the thesis that historical explanations explain solely tokens, one need not quarrel about Bunge's use of the term "law". It suffices to point out that sometimes historians are interested in explaining more than unique, singular occurrences, namely types of events (like historical patterns or trends; see also Little 2010). For instance, they explain why absolutist states did well in collecting taxes, or how a Roman emperor managed the finances.…”

Empirical Urban Theory for Archaeologists

“…For example, "The purpose of the unified theory of artifact design, as a middle-range theory, is to assign potential etic meanings to the design attributes of a class of artifacts" (Carr 1995: 246). 3 They are certainly crucial from a scientific realist approach to theory and explanation (Boyd 2010;Bunge 1993;Little 2010;Pawson 2000;Wylie 2002), although perhaps not to interpretivist approaches. empirical content.…”