No Intentions in the Brain: A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Science of Intention

Abstract

In their paper “Why we may not find intentions in the brain,” Uithol et al. (2014) convincingly argue that “the processes underlying action initiation and control are considerably more dynamic and context sensitive than the concept of intention can allow for.” Their paper could be seen as a critical note to the widespread tendency to search for identifiable neurocorrelates of mental concepts. Their more specific suggestion is that the absence of clear neural correlates undermines the traditional understanding of intention. In this paper I will try to take their argument a step further. First of all, I will argue that our folk psychology leaves room for various understandings of intentions, and that the concept of intention discussed by Uithol et al. is an academic concept that has its roots in the causal theory of action and in functionalist approaches to cognition. I will argue that both these paradigms are contested, and that there seems to be theoretical wiggle room for alternative understandings of intention. Subsequently I outline such an alternative perspective based on Wittgensteinian philosophy of psychology, emphasizing the regulative role of intention talk. However, the proposed understanding raises the question how to think about neural realization: is intention talk “just” talk, or do intentions really exist? I will propose that intention talk should be understood as a form of pattern recognition, and that the patterns involved are extended in both space and time. The conclusion outlines some important implications for the neuroscientific investigation of intentions.

An overlooked concept? Intention to return to work among individuals on sick leave due to common mental disorders: A scoping review

“…However, it is important to keep in mind that there may be relevant studies that were not identified for this review, as intention is a difficult concept to cover completely in database searches. Even so, it is remarkable that intention-a concept that was integrated into research on human behaviour a half century ago (Rossetti et al, 2014)has barely been used since then regarding RTW among individuals on sick leave due to CMDs. This may be due to the abstractness of the concept, which makes it difficult to capture in an adequate manner.…”

“…However, intention has been shown to be an essential aspect of various health behaviours (Asare, 2015;McDermott et al, 2015), and also RTW after sick leave for musculoskeletal injuries (Dunstan et al, 2013). The roots of studying intention can be | 603 HEDLUND found in the 1970s (Rossetti et al, 2014), when psychologists were trying to evaluate the constituent parts of human behaviour in an effort to make sense of it. There is, however, no clear definition of the concept (Rossetti et al, 2014).…”

“…The roots of studying intention can be | 603 HEDLUND found in the 1970s (Rossetti et al, 2014), when psychologists were trying to evaluate the constituent parts of human behaviour in an effort to make sense of it. There is, however, no clear definition of the concept (Rossetti et al, 2014). Attempts have been made to define intention, for example, indicating that it can be used to understand, explain and even criticise human behaviour (Malle & Knobe, 1997).…”

Folk psychology as a causal language

“…First, what kind of causation could be at work here? This question comes up because we have argued that a reductionist account is blocked (Borsboom et al, 2019; Kalis, 2019). And second, how can folk psychological descriptions be shown to be correct or incorrect?…”

Witgenstein on intention and theory of action

“…Комментаторская историко-философская литература по теме насчитывает среди известных и влиятельных десятки источников (см., в частности, работы Криспина Райта). Однако и актуальное современное исследование «интенциональности» не обходится без ссылок на работы Витгенштейна (см., например: [Kalis, 2019]). Поэтому для историков философии закономерным становится вопрос о подходах к прочтению Витгенштейна: необходим ли исторический контекст (реконструкция критикуемых взглядов и концепций) или же лучшего понимания можно добиться в порядке актуализации заметок Витгенштейна по отношению к современным исследованиям по проблеме интенциональности (и пр.).…”