2020
DOI: 10.3390/cryptography4020011
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NotchPUF: Printed Circuit Board PUF Based on Microstrip Notch Filter

Abstract: Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) are primitives that are designed to leverage naturally occurring variations to produce a random bitstring. Current PUF designs are typically implemented in silicon or utilize variations found in commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) parts. Because of this, existing designs are insufficient for the authentication of Printed Circuit Boards (PCBs). In this paper, we propose a novel PUF design that leverages board variations in a manufactured PCB to generate unique and stable IDs for… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(5 citation statements)
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“…The protection-based veriication schemes require, to some degree, control and management of the supply chain. Authentication using physical ingerprints such as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [27,48], watermarking [32], tags [49], and secure enclosures [19] are examples of such protectionbased approaches. The primary requirement for these solutions is to integrate physical protections in the early stages of design and manufacturing.…”
Section: Protection-basedmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The protection-based veriication schemes require, to some degree, control and management of the supply chain. Authentication using physical ingerprints such as Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) [27,48], watermarking [32], tags [49], and secure enclosures [19] are examples of such protectionbased approaches. The primary requirement for these solutions is to integrate physical protections in the early stages of design and manufacturing.…”
Section: Protection-basedmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The main challenge of these methods is their incompatibility to diferent levels of abstractions on electronic systems, from ICs to the entire PCB. For instance, while there are several PUF realizations for Integrated Circuits (ICs) [17,24,38], the proposed PUFs for PCBs [27,48] are still not ready-to-use on a larger scale. On the other hand, while high-security protections, such as secure enclosures for PCB [19], are efective against tampering and modiications, they are very costly and need a highly customized design making them unusable for legacy systems.…”
Section: Protection-basedmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…PUF defense mechanisms are derived from silicon manufactured devices or commercially available designs, therefore leaving the PCB without an effective PUF generation mechanism. Martin and Plusquellic proposed a novel PUF design that incorporates randomness from variation in the PCB substrate from manufacturing to generate unique and stable IDs for each PCB [9]. For their design, the randomness is generated from a single copper trace.…”
Section: A Current Pcb Obfuscation Techniquesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…MEMS devices are mass manufactured and packaged similar to ICs and possess unique process variations which can be used for identification [13] or physical unclonable function generation [9], [14]. These PUFs combined with MEMS can be used actively or passively to protect a PCB from circuit tampering or component removal.…”
Section: Micro Electro-mechanical Systems (Mems)mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The same is true for tampering and counterfeit attacks against circuit boards, thus chip-level PUFs also cannot detect tampering and cloning on the board [9]. PCB-level counterfeit and tamper detection generate a unique fingerprint by extracting random variations in PCBs during the manufacturing process to verify their authenticity, which includes extracting parameters such as trace impedance or output variations of specific circuits, and quantifying them into digital responses [10]- [12]. However, PCB-level counterfeit and tamper detection cannot detect tampering and counterfeiting against the chip [8].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%