2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11786-009-0020-y
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Obtaining and Solving Systems of Equations in Key Variables Only for the Small Variants of AES

Abstract: This work is devoted to attacking the small scale variants of the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) via systems that contain only the initial key variables. To this end, we investigate a system of equations that naturally arises in the AES, and then introduce an elimination of all the intermediate variables via normal form reductions. The resulting system in key variables only is solved then. We also consider a possibility to apply our method in the meet-in-the-middle scenario especially with several plaintex… Show more

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Cited by 8 publications
(13 citation statements)
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“…As mentioned earlier, chaos- and algebraic-based techniques are extensively used to design the confusion component. Chaos- and algebraic-based techniques provide favorable features for the design of confusion components; however, researchers have also identified various cryptanalysis on these techniques including interpolation attacks [ 9 12 ], Gröbner basis attack [ 13 19 ], SAT solver [ 20 – 27 ], linear and differential attacks [ 28 42 ], XL attacks [ 43 45 ], and XSL attack [ 9 , 46 55 ]. Similarly, chaos-based techniques are also commonly applied in the designs of confusion components [ 56 68 ], dynamical degradation of chaotic systems [ 69 73 ], predictability [ 74 85 ], discontinuity in chaotic sequences [ 70 , 86 90 ], small number of control parameters [ 76 , 77 , 91 , 92 ], finite precision effect [ 70 72 , 86 , 88 ], and short quantity of randomness [ 71 , 72 , 86 , 88 90 , 93 96 ].…”
Section: Attacks On Confusion Component Design Schemesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As mentioned earlier, chaos- and algebraic-based techniques are extensively used to design the confusion component. Chaos- and algebraic-based techniques provide favorable features for the design of confusion components; however, researchers have also identified various cryptanalysis on these techniques including interpolation attacks [ 9 12 ], Gröbner basis attack [ 13 19 ], SAT solver [ 20 – 27 ], linear and differential attacks [ 28 42 ], XL attacks [ 43 45 ], and XSL attack [ 9 , 46 55 ]. Similarly, chaos-based techniques are also commonly applied in the designs of confusion components [ 56 68 ], dynamical degradation of chaotic systems [ 69 73 ], predictability [ 74 85 ], discontinuity in chaotic sequences [ 70 , 86 90 ], small number of control parameters [ 76 , 77 , 91 , 92 ], finite precision effect [ 70 72 , 86 , 88 ], and short quantity of randomness [ 71 , 72 , 86 , 88 90 , 93 96 ].…”
Section: Attacks On Confusion Component Design Schemesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We apply the degrevlex ordering, where secret key variables have lower order than other variables. We use a similar notation to the one used by Bulygin and Brickenstein [7]. The SRfalse(n,2,1,4false) cipher is described by the following system of equations:{1em4ptsboxfalse(p0+k0,0,x0,0false)1em1em1em1em1emsboxfalse(p1+k0,1,x0,1false)1em1em1em1em1emsboxfalse(L0false(xi1,0,xi1,1false)+ki,0,xi,0false)forthickmathspacei=1,,n1em1emsboxfalse(L1false(xi1,0,xi1,1false)+ki,1,xi,1false)forthickmathspacei=1,,n1em1emc0+L0false(xn,0,xn,1false)+kn,01em1em1em1emc1+L1false(xn,0,xn,1false)+kn,11em1em1em1emsboxfalse(ki,0,ki+1,0…”
Section: Sr Block Ciphersmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…[5] report results of experiments, where cryptanalysis is performed for 4‐bit and 8‐bit versions of an round‐reduced AES using the Gröbner basis algorithm F4 [6]. To our knowledge, the best algebraic cryptanalysis results for this family of ciphers are reported in [7].…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…S-box designs of pure algebraic structures are jeopardized due to the intrinsic algebraic structure. Various algebraic attacks are available for algebraic construction of S-boxes including linear and differential attacks 3 – 17 , interpolation attacks 18 – 21 , Gröbner basis attack 22 – 28 , side-channel attacks 29 – 37 , SAT solver 38 – 45 , XSL attack 18 , 46 – 55 , XL attacks 56 – 60 .…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%