Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis

Abstract

Original citationKavanagh, D. (2004) Ocularcentrism and its Others: A Framework for Metatheoretical Analysis AbstractThere is a contemporary skepticism towards vision based metaphors in management and organization studies that reflects a more general pattern across the social sciences. In short, there has been a shift away from ocularcentrism. This shift provides a useful basis for meta-theoretical analysis of the philosophical discourse that informs organizational analysis. The paper begins by briefly discussing the vision-generated, vision-centred interpretation of knowledge, truth and reality that has characterised the Western philosophical tradition. Taking late 18 th century rationalism as the high-point of ocularcentrism, the paper then presents a meta-theoretical framework based on three trajectories that the critiques of ocularcentrism have subsequently taken. The first exposes the limits of the metaphor by, paradoxically, taking it to its limits. The second trajectory seeks to displace the primordial position of the ocular metaphor and replace it with an alternative lexicon based on other human senses. Finally, the third trajectory describes how the Enlightenment ocular characterisation of the visual and mental worlds has effectively been inverted in the postmodern moment.

Visualizing practices in project-based design: tracing connections through cascades of visual representations

“…Kavanagh (2004) describes the emphasis on writing as part of a wider ocular-centrism in Western thought, as writing is largely a visual exercise, unlike speaking, which is centred on hearing. The translation of interview data, from audio files into transcripts, is part of a process of making data visual.…”

From Mirroring to World‐Making: Research as Future Forming

“…Traditional practices of research remain unchallenged; and while there is an impressive accretion in the range of practices, they do little to violate or challenge the basic structure of inquiry. Most important for present purposes, this condition of reflective pragmatism sustains an ocularcentric conception of knowledge (Levin, ; Kavanagh, ). That is, the vast share of these research practices carry with them a dualist premise, distinguishing between the world on the one side and the observer on the other.…”

The limits of process: On (re)reading Henri Bergson

“…In many ways this critique mirrors those which draw on Bergson to challenge 'ocularcentrism', or the primacy of the visual in knowing the world (Kavanagh, 2004). However, it is noticeable that the injunctions from 'strong' process theorists, such as Nayak (2008), cling to the centrality of introspection.…”