This paper revisits the issue of the unilateral divorce law, taking into account that: 1/ the decisions to engage in marriage and then to divorce or to stay married are fundamentally sequential decisions; 2/ household consumption has a large joint component, generating economies of scale. The unilateral divorce law is modelled through the combination of exclusive rights on the marriage dissolution and a monetary transfer to the parent having custody of the children. We analyze the influence of alternative compensation rules both in the short run (probability and efficiency of divorce) and in the long run (selection of marriages). We also show that a decrease in the costs of divorce proceedings has by no means commonplace consequences on marriage ontracting; particularly when consideration of parents' altruism and child support is introduced, more marriages are contracted when the cost of divorces decreases.
JEL Classification: D1-K10-K12-K41-J12Keywords: marriage models, unilateral divorce law, the parents' altruism and protective measures for children.Come on now, honey [Ah! Gudule] Don't you wanna live with me?Excuse-toi (M. Jagger -K. Richards) Ou je reprends tout ça. (B. Vian) * University Nancy 2, UFR AES, 4 Rue de la Ravinelle -CO 7026, 54035 Nancy cedex, France; tel: 03 83 19 27 60; Eric.Langlais@univ-nancy2.fr.† I am grateful to Yannick Gabuthy and Nuno Garoupa for their comments on a previous draft of the paper, and also to the referees of the journal for their stimulating criticisms and suggestions. As usual, all remaining errors are mine.