On Racist Hate Speech and the Scope of a Free Speech Principle

Abstract

In this paper, we argue that to properly understand our commitment to a principle of free speech, we must pay attention to what should count as speech for the purposes of such a principle. We defend the view that ‘speech’ here should be a technical term, with something other than its ordinary sense. We then offer a partial characterization of this technical sense. We contrast our view with some influential views about free speech (due to Greenawalt, Cohen, and Sunstein), and show that our view has distinct advantages. Finally, we consider racist hate speech. Here, we argue that if certain theorists (e.g., Lawrence) are right about what some racist hate speech does, then such speech should fall outside the scope of the free speech principle, and so, should be as regulable as any non-speech action.

Propositional attitudes, harm and public hate speech situations: towards a maieutic approach

“…In this article, I maintain the distinction between speech in the ordinary sense and speech in the technical sense (Maitra and McGowan, 2010; Schauer, 1979). Here, ‘speech’ is not only a vocal address delivered to a more or less wide audience.…”

“…Here, ‘speech’ is not only a vocal address delivered to a more or less wide audience. I understand the word in the technical sense so that some actions that are not speech in the ordinary sense (such as publishing a pamphlet, drawing murals, writing libels) may fall within the scope of the article (Maitra and McGowan, 2010). Moreover, my focus is on speech that is public – that is, speech and actions that address an audience and that may have a much broader resonance.…”

“…More specifically, my argument is on public speech that expresses hate. The definition of ‘hate speech’ is certainly a disputed matter, and setting the conceptual perimeter in one or another direction may imply different normative positions (Maitra and McGowan, 2010; Yong, 2011). By ‘public hate speech’, I refer to actions and discourses that simultaneously deny the basic standing of individuals who belong to a certain target group (Brettschneider, 2012; Delgado, 2018; Lepoutre, 2017; Matsuda, 2018; Seglow, 2016; Waldron, 2012) and aim to have an effect on and beyond a certain audience (Delgado, 2018; Langton, 2012; Maitra and McGowan, 2012; United Nations, 1965).…”

“…Such effects are there because the incitement of hatred is a characteristic of public hate speech. Much as the utterance ‘You are fired’ constitutes a firing, hate speech constitutes an action of a particular kind – namely, intense hate (Maitra and McGowan, 2010: 350). Hate speech, then, provided that the intended audience recognizes the action, and provided also that recipients perform a mental act (that leads them to take up a different attitude from the attitude they had before the utterance), may cause hearers to do certain things (Langton, 2012).…”

Counterspeech and Ordinary Citizens: How? When?

“…"Speech" is intended in the technical sense in which nonverbal expressionssuch as painting murals, burning crosses, and marching-fall within the scope of my argument. 11 By "public" I mean to say that speech addresses an audience and may have resonance beyond the communicative interaction. "Hate" is also intended as a technical term; it stands for expressions that deny the basic standing of members of vulnerable groups.…”