On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions

Caragiannis, Ioannis; Kaklamanis, Christos; Kanellopoulos, Panagiotis; Kyropoulou, Maria

doi:10.1145/1993574.1993588

Cited by 85 publications

(113 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…This is a typical assumption in the Bayes-Nash price of anarchy literature [1,3,6,10,19,21,22] with [2] being the only exception we are aware of. Unfortunately, our proof of the pure Bayes-Nash price of anarchy bound does not carry over to the case of correlated valuations either (for the same reason mentioned above).…”

Section: Lemma 52mentioning

confidence: 89%

“…Instead, it resorts to bounding the utility of each player by appropriately selected deviations which reveal a relation between the social welfare at equilibrium and the optimal social welfare. This approach has been used in a series of papers that mostly focus on auctions (e.g., see [1,2,3,6,10,19,22]) and is actually the approach we follow in the current paper as well.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…(an approach that has also been used in different contexts in [2,10,21,23]) with a probability distribution that depends only on the optimal allocation and the valuation function of the player. In contrast, the deviating bid we consider depends on the bid strategies at equilibrium (this is in the same spirit as the recent analysis of Feldman et al [6]) and, more interestingly, it is deterministic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

Caragiannis

Voudouris

2014

Algorithmic Game Theory

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According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -such as bandwidth -by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of 26.8% on the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to 50% over both equilibrium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and, furthermore, we argue that it cannot be improved by arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between 36% and 50%) on the price of anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account.

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Section: Lemma 52mentioning

confidence: 89%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

Caragiannis

Voudouris

2014

Algorithmic Game Theory

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“…Lucier and Borodin studied Bayes-Nash Equilibria of non-truthful auctions based on greedy allocation algorithms [16]. Paes Leme and Tardos [20], Lucier and Paes Leme [17] and Caragiannis et al [4] studied the ineffficiency of Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second price auction. Roughgarden [22] showed that many price of anarchy bounds carry over to imply bounds also for learning outcomes.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects

Lucier

Singer

Syrgkanis

et al. 2013

Web and Internet Economics

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Abstract. We study simple item bidding mechanisms for the combinatorial public project problem and explore their efficiency guarantees in various well-known solution concepts. We first study sequential mechanisms where each agent, in sequence, reports her bid for every item in a predefined order on the agents determined by the mechanism. We show that if agents' valuations are unit-demand any subgame perfect equilibrium of a sequential mechanism achieves the optimal social welfare. For the simultaneous bidding equivalent of the above auction we show that for any class of bidder valuations, all Strong Nash Equilibria achieve at least a O(log n) factor of the optimal social welfare. For Pure Nash Equilibria we show that the worst-case loss in efficiency is proportional to the number of agents. For public projects in which only one item is selected we show constructively that there always exists a Pure Nash Equilibrium that guarantees at least 1 2 (1 − 1 n ) of the optimum. We also show efficiency bounds for Correlated Equilibria and Bayes-Nash Equilibria, via the recent smooth mechanism framework [26].

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“…Other recent papers study simple auctions used in practice and show that high social welfare can be achieved even when players' valuations come from arbitrarily correlated distributions [Lucier and Paes Leme 2011;Caragiannis et al 2012].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bayesian sequential auctions

Syrgkanis

Tardos

2012

Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

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In many natural settings agents participate in multiple different auctions that are not simultaneous. In such auctions, future opportunities affect strategic considerations of the players. The goal of this paper is to develop a quantitative understanding of outcomes of such sequential auctions. In earlier work we initiated the study of the price of anarchy in sequential auctions. We considered sequential first price auctions in the full information model, where players are aware of all future opportunities, as well as the valuation of all players. In this paper, we study efficiency in sequential auctions in the Bayesian environment, relaxing the informational assumption on the players. We focus on two environments, both studied in the full information model in Paes , matching markets and matroid auctions. In the full information environment, a sequential first price cut auction for matroid settings is efficient. In Bayesian environments this is no longer the case, as we show using a simple example with three players. Our main result is a bound of 3 on the price of anarchy in both matroid auctions and matching markets. To bound the price of anarchy we need to consider possible deviations at an equilibrium. In a sequential Bayesian environment the effect of deviations is more complex than in one-shot games; early bids allow others to infer information about the player's value. We create effective deviations despite the presence of this difficulty by introducing a bluffing technique of independent interest.

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On the efficiency of equilibria in generalized second price auctions

Cited by 85 publications

References 28 publications

Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

Welfare Guarantees for Proportional Allocations

Equilibrium in Combinatorial Public Projects

Bayesian sequential auctions

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