On the rationality of pluralistic ignorance

Abstract

Pluralistic ignorance is a socio-psychological phenomenon that involves a systematic discrepancy between people's private beliefs and public behavior in certain social contexts. Recently, pluralistic ignorance has gained increased attention in formal and social epistemology. But to get clear on what precisely a formal and social epistemological account of pluralistic ignorance should look like, we need answers to at least the following two questions: What exactly is the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance? And can the phenomenon arise among perfectly rational agents? In this paper, we propose answers to both these questions. First, we characterize different versions of pluralistic ignorance and define the version that we claim most adequately captures the examples cited as paradigmatic cases of pluralistic ignorance in the literature. In doing so, we will stress certain key epistemic and social interactive aspects of the phenomenon. Second, given our characterization of pluralistic ignorance, we argue that the phenomenon can indeed arise in groups of perfectly rational agents. This, in turn, ensures that the tools of formal epistemology can be fully utilized to reason about pluralistic ignorance.

The Irrationality of Pluralistic Ignorance

“…Why might one think that the belief in (ii) is epistemically rational? In attempting to establish the possibility that pluralistically ignorant agents are epistemically rational, Bjerring et al (2014Bjerring et al ( : 2463 consider the following question: "[W]hich epistemic factors can help explain why an agent ignoresor at least assigns a very low credence tothe possibility . .…”

“…. has epistemic reasons to ignore the possibility that the actions of others do not truly reect what they believe" (Bjerring et al 2014(Bjerring et al : 2464.…”

“…Such an agent cannot be epistemically rational in continuing to be pluralistically ignorant. 6 Note that while Andersen (2000) doesn't describe his story as a case of pluralistic ignorance, it is taken as a standard example by, e.g., Bicchieri (2006) and Bjerring et al (2014).…”

Por que Juízes Aplicam Padrões Jurídicos Espúrios? Uma Abordagem Comportamental

“…Todos tomam as ações dos outros como evidência forte para suas crenças íntimas sobre P. (BJERRING et. al, 2014(BJERRING et.…”

“…Outro exemplo, mais concreto e comum, é o caso da sala dos alunos inteligentes: não é raro que professores, após explicar um ponto bem complexo da disciplina, perguntar aos alunos se existe alguma dúvida, mas ninguém se dispõe a levantar a mão solicitando esclarecimentos. Nenhum aluno levanta a mão por temer ser publicamente exibido como o único que não entendeu a aula, embora muitos tenham ficado com dúvidas (BJERRING et. al., 2014(BJERRING et.…”