Operationalizing national preferences on Europe and differentiated integration

Abstract

The existing literature on party and government preferences on Europe mostly focuses on the integration process as a whole. In addition, studies of party-based Euroscepticism tend to offer competing typologies that present some terminological problems. With the increase in differentiation and the potential for disintegration, it is now important to deconstruct support for European integration per policy area. Accordingly, the main purpose of this contribution is to solve problems of existing conceptualizations of élite-based Euroscepticism by presenting a specific operationalization of support for European integration. Based on a qualitative analysis of party documents and élite interviews, such operationalization focuses on policies and policy areas where differentiation takes place, using a scale ranging from full opposition to full support for integration and taking into account internal divisions. This operationalization is then applied to three Nordic countries that have experienced different levels of (differentiated) integration since the early 1990s: Finland; Sweden; and Norway. The contribution concludes that whereas existing categorizations of Euroscepticism are useful to broadly understand élite preferences, operationalizing support for European integration per policy area where differentiation takes place can help understand the mainstreaming of Euroscepticism and offers a more accurate way of understanding new situations where parties supporting and opposing participation in European Union policies co-exist in coalition governments.

Differentiated Integration and Disintegration in the EU after Brexit: Risks versus Opportunities

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Does political discourse matter? Comparing party positions and public attitudes on immigration in England

“…Schmidt 2002;Leruth 2015) or on a how public opinion shapes party stances (e.g. Hills 2002;Adams et al 2004;Norris and Lovenduski 2004;Bale and Partos 2014), few qualitative studies analysed the role of party stances (or more broadly elite discourse) on public discourse (see e.g.…”

Smart and secure borders through automated border control systems in the EU? The views of political stakeholders in the Member States

“…Here some strands in critical border studies help to analyse the potential consequences of such views, warning how any divergence on the part of the Schengen security community from the path of regional integration and solidarity could send Europe back to the traditional power politics of national interests, self-reliance and mistrust (Alkopher and Blanc 2016). Such a return is possible since right-wing Eurosceptic populism has become mainstreamed (Brack and Startin 2015), especially in our cases of the UK (Auel and Raunio 2014) and Finland (Leruth 2015). In this situation, voices such as our third view portray the "people" being justifiably concerned about increasing immigration and surveillance.…”

“…Meanwhile, the policy debate on border control in Europe features the effects of differentiated integration, whereby EU-level harmonisation efforts coexist with different views among the Member States (see Leruth 2015). Twenty-two out of 28 EU Member States belong to the Schengen area.…”