Optimal channel strategies in a supply chain under green manufacturer financial distress with advance payment discount

Zhang, Chong; Wang, Yaxian; Ma, Peng

doi:10.1111/itor.12841

Cited by 24 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…Yang et al [5] considered a two-level GSC composed of a manufacturer and retailers with capital constraints and competition, designed revenuesharing contracts from the SC's internal and external financing channels to coordinate the profit distribution GSC. Zhang [51] compared the optimal green decisions with and without green investments under manufacturers' capital constraints. Moreover, Fang and Xu [52] compared green credit financing and hybrid financing modes and concluded that manufacturers with capital constraints were also willing to make green investments.…”

Section: Gsc Financing With Capital Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

et al. 2021

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The purpose of this research is to examine the green supply chain (GSC) financing decisions of manufacturers and capital-constrained retailers in order to establish a Stackelberg game model under decentralized and centralized decision-making. This paper studies the influence of retailers’ choice of trade credit or bank loan financing strategy on a GSC’s performance and analyzes their decision-making tendency. The results show that manufacturers should provide trade credit and participate in retailers’ financing decisions to avoid double marginal effects under both centralized and decentralized decision-making. Interestingly, the optimal value of green marketing effort and retailer order quantity was twice as high as the decentralized under the centralized decision, indicating that the centralized decision could better improve GSC’s financing efficiency. Especially when the trade credit financing strategy is feasible, this effect is more significant. Finally, the outcomes are verified through numerical simulation, which references GSC practitioners in management decisions.

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Section: Gsc Financing With Capital Constraintmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

et al. 2021

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“…It is easy to obtain μ > (1/2) from inequality (31). In equation ( 28), because θ ∈ [0, 1], μ > (1/2), it is to get the result (zt * /zθ) < 0 in equation ( 28), thus proving the conclusion.…”

Section: Proofmentioning

confidence: 64%

“…Wang et al study the competitive and sustainable supply chain network design problem by considering the chain-to-chain competition between two supply chains [30]. Zhang et al compare the optimal green decisions and profits under single-channel or dual-channel strategies with and without green investment [31]. Wang et al study the decisions and coordination of green e-commerce supply chain under green manufactures' fairness concerns considering the product green degree and the e-commerce platform's service [32].…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental Investment Decision of Green Supply Chain considering the Green Uncertainty

Shao-bo

Yao

2020

Complexity

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The uncertainty of eco-friendly intermediate components has an important impact on green supply chain decisions. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model of green investment decision-making among enterprises is established by considering the case of the supplier’s green investment alone and the case of the manufacturer and the supplier’s joint green investment. The influence of green uncertainty on enterprise’s decision-making is analyzed, and the green investment decision-making strategies of both sides in two cases are compared. There are four main conclusions derived from the results: (i) with the increase in the supplier’s green cost coefficient, the supplier will reduce the green investment and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (ii) with a decrease in uncertainty for eco-friendly intermediate components and the increase in their feasibility factor, the supplier will increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase the investment in environment, and the manufacturer will reduce the share of the green costs; (iii) the increase in the manufacturer’s share of green costs will promote the supplier to increase the greenness of intermediate components and increase its green investment, which shall increase the supplier’s optional choice space of for green investment; (iv) in the case of the manufacturer and the supplier jointly making a green investment, the threshold value for the environmental input of the supply chain members (i.e., the manufacturer and the supplier) is lower, and the supply chain members will have more choice space. At the same time, the care for environment in the case of a cooperative is higher than that in the case of a supplier investing alone.

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“…Channel choice based on online retailing involves two types. First, some scholars focus on channel introduction, for example, the introduction of online retailing channel in addition to the offline channel (e.g., Liu and Zhang, 2006; Arya et al., 2007; Bernstein et al., 2008; Yoo and Lee, 2011; Li et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2018; Salma and Simon, 2018; Wang et al., 2018; He et al., 2019; Cao et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2020), the supplier offline entry when it sells products through the e‐tailer (e.g., Zhang and Zhang, 2020), and whether to introduce the agency selling format in addition to the reselling format (e.g., Yan et al., 2018a; Yan et al., 2019; Chen et al., 2020). Second, some studies compare the direct channel with the agency selling format or (and) the reselling format (e.g., Ow and Wood, 2011; Yan et al., 2018b; Shen et al., 2019; Pu et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2021a).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Interaction between the introduction strategy of the third‐party online channel and the choice of online sales format

Shi

Jiang

Wang

2021

Int Trans Operational Res

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On the online platform of e‐tailers (e.g., Amazon), there are many third‐party retailers who can resell products by paying e‐tailers a platform usage fee. When e‐tailers sell manufacturers’ products through the agency selling or reselling format, manufacturers may also sell the products via the third‐party retailers, i.e., the third‐party online channel. Therefore, in an online retailing supply chain composed of a manufacturer, an e‐tailer ad a third‐party retailer, this paper employs game theory to study the interaction between the introduction strategy of such channel and the choice of online sales format. The results show that under the agency selling format, the manufacturer should always introduce the channel to reduce the loss caused by platform usage fee and the low sales efficiency; under the reselling format, if the platform fee rate is small, the manufacturer will introduce such channel because of benefiting from downstream competition brought by the channel, otherwise, vice versa. When the channel is introduced under both sales formats and the sales efficiency of the manufacturer is not very high or very low, with the discount factor of consumer utility in this channel being large, the e‐tailer should choose the reselling format even if the platform fee rate is large. In case the channel is introduced only under the agency selling format and the sales efficiency of the manufacturer is not very high or very low, even if the platform fee rate is very large, the e‐tailer should also choose the reselling format. These choices always benefit the manufacturer (i.e., two win‐win situations). Under the agency selling format, the third‐party retailer should always improve the utility gained from purchasing from this channel, but it should keep the utility at an appropriate level under the reselling format.

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Optimal channel strategies in a supply chain under green manufacturer financial distress with advance payment discount

Cited by 24 publications

References 51 publications

Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

Optimal Financing Strategy in a Capital-Constrained Supply Chain with Retailer Green Marketing Efforts

Environmental Investment Decision of Green Supply Chain considering the Green Uncertainty

Interaction between the introduction strategy of the third‐party online channel and the choice of online sales format

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