Optimal VCG mechanisms to assign multiple bads

You, Jung S.

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.06.005

Cited by 3 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 29 publications

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“…Moulin and Shenker, 2001;Olszewski, 2004;and Juarez, 2008). The other strand of literature, under the requirements of decisive efficiency and incentive compatibility, attempts to estimate and minimize the budget imbalance (see, Deb and Seo, 1998;Danilov and Sotskov 2002;Cavallo, 2006;Guo and Conitzer, 2009;Mehta et al, 2009;Moulin, 2009Moulin, , 2010Yengin, 2012;You, 2015). In this paper, we aim to discuss the questions above in a more general framework.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights

Jiang

2016

Mathematical Social Sciences

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Please cite this article as: Yi, J., Li, Y., A general impossibility theorem and its application to individual rights. Mathematical Social Sciences (2016), http://dx.This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.Research highlights > We prove that it is impossible to find an incentive compatible social choice mechanism with finite social welfare losses > The impossibility also occur even if we replace incentive compatibility with approximately incentive compatibility. > We discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights. AbstractIn this paper, we generalize Green-Laffont's (1979) impossibility theorem to the following form: in quasi-linear environments, when the set of each agent's types is sufficiently rich, we can not find mechanisms that allow bounded deviations from the decisive efficiency, incentive compatibility and budget-balance at the same time. Hence, it is impossible to find an incentive compatible mechanism with minimum social welfare losses. Furthermore, we discuss the compatibility problems between incentive and individual rights in a quasi-linear environment (see Sen, 1970aSen, , 1970bDeb et al., 1997). Specifically, some new impossibility results are established. JEL Classification: C79; D82; D71.

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