Optimality of the uniform rule under single-peaked preferences

Juárez, Rubén; You, Jung S.

doi:10.1007/s40505-018-0141-z

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…One of the most studied rules in the cost-sharing literature is the uniform rule [14,15,24], which is a variation of AC that respect stand-alone core stability. This rule can be trivially adapted to our network setting by considering the cost of each link as the demand of the agents.…”

Section: Efficiency Stand-alone Core Stability and Lrpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks

Juárez

2019

Games

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We consider the problem of sharing the cost of connecting a large number of atomless agents in a network. The centralized agency elicits the target nodes that agents want to connect, and charges agents based on their demands. We look for a cost-sharing mechanism that satisfies three desirable properties: efficiency which charges agents based on the minimum total cost of connecting them in a network, stand-alone core stability which requires charging agents not more than the cost of connecting by themselves directly, and limit routing-proofness which prevents agents from profitable reporting as several agents connecting from A to C to B instead of A to B. We show that these three properties are not always compatible for any set of cost functions and demands. However, when these properties are compatible, a new egalitarian mechanism is shown to satisfy them. When the properties are not compatible, we find a rule that meets stand-alone core stability, limit routing-proofness and minimizes the budget deficit.

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Section: Efficiency Stand-alone Core Stability and Lrpmentioning

confidence: 99%

Routing-Proofness in Congestion-Prone Networks

Juárez

2019

Games

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“…For simplicity, and to circumvent the technical difficulties that arise in games in extensive form where agents play in a continuous way (see, for instance, Alós-Ferrer and Ritzberger (2013)), we consider the discrete division problem, first studied byHerrero and Martínez (2011).3 Division problems have been studied intensively; see, for instance,Thomson (1994aThomson ( , 1994bThomson ( , 1997,Barberà's (2011) survey on strategy-proofness, and, more recently,Moulin (2017),Wakayama (2017),Juarez and You (2019),Bochet and Tumennassan (2020),Bochet, Sakai, and Thomson (2021), orThomson's (2021) survey.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…33 Division problems have been studied intensively; see, for instance, Thomson (1994a, 1994b, 1997), Barberà's (2011) survey on strategy‐proofness, and, more recently, Moulin (2017), Wakayama (2017), Juarez and You (2019), Bochet and Tumennassan (2020), Bochet, Sakai, and Thomson (2021), or Thomson's (2021) survey. …”

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confidence: 99%