2017
DOI: 10.1590/0034-7612154969
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Pagando o preço de governar: custos de gerência de coalizão no presidencialismo brasileiro

Abstract: This paper examines the effects of a president's coalition management decisions on the costs of governing. An innovative Governing Costs Index (GCI) was developed, taking into consideration political and financial transfers made by the president to coalition parties. GCI is calculated employing a principal component analysis. The relationship between the variations on the management strategies and the costs were estimated using a first-differences panel. GCI was considered as the dependent variable and the coa… Show more

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Cited by 38 publications
(45 citation statements)
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References 39 publications
(27 reference statements)
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“…In DAS 5 and 6 positions, among the party appointees, percentages varied between 39% of PT affiliates, in the second term of Lula, and reached 53% in Dilma's second term. In addition to discovering that the PT concentrated political power in the division of ministerial positions (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017, Praça et al, 2011, there is also a concentration in upper level bureaucratic posts. 17…”
Section: Affiliations Party Labels and Mandatesmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…In DAS 5 and 6 positions, among the party appointees, percentages varied between 39% of PT affiliates, in the second term of Lula, and reached 53% in Dilma's second term. In addition to discovering that the PT concentrated political power in the division of ministerial positions (Bertholini & Pereira, 2017, Praça et al, 2011, there is also a concentration in upper level bureaucratic posts. 17…”
Section: Affiliations Party Labels and Mandatesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Due to the lack of detailed or systematic data on party affiliations in bureaucracy, the specialized literature assumes that: a) appointing a party minister gives the party exclusive rights to choose names within high level ministerial bureaucracy; and b) that these choices are predominantly partisan. This is the case in the original analyzes on the relationship between government coalition and the president's legislative support, and usually this is related to the debate on party proportionality in the cabinet's power division (Amorim, 2019;Bertholini & Pereira, 2017). 1 In general, this analysis considers that the chain of command from the minister to his subordinates would flow through links connected by common party ties.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Presidents in multiparty democracies typically borrow strategies from parliamentary systems when distributing cabinet posts as trade chips in order to build congressional majorities -something the literature dubs "coalitional presidentialism" (Abranches 1998;Chaisty, Cheeseman, and Power 2018). Depending on macroeconomic conditions and compositional factors (e.g., proportionality and ideological heterogeneity), coalitional maintenance costs can be quite high, thus impacting cabinet size, ministry expenditure levels, and the availability of pork for legislators (Bertholini and Pereira 2017). In federal systems, where representatives are linked to subnational constituencies, cabinet distribution must also weigh up territorial considerations, thus linking national and local politics.…”
Section: Politics In Brazil and The Northeastmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But the greatest change in the PT's growth strategy came after it took national office and then began to expand into the Northeast Region by leveraging the prerogatives and resources of executive office at the national level to build pragmatic alliances. These new allies were increasingly heterogeneous and thus raised the costs of maintaining the president's (and governors') coalition (Bertholini and Pereira 2017), which ultimately cost the PT its transformational project.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Si la base de apoyo al gobierno se desplomó en 2016 durante la presidencia de Rousseff (2011-2016) (Nunes y Ranufo 2017), al año siguiente vio un presidente con una coalición de apoyo disciplinado y mayoritario que ha garantizado un alto éxito legislativo de las iniciativas presidenciales. Aun cuando la presidencia en Brasil tiene capacidad presupuestaria, administrativa y legislativa para construir el apoyo mayoritario, el contexto de un congreso con elevada fragmentación partidaria (Limongi 2006), la administración de esta coalición política es uno de los principales desafíos en la implementación de las políticas públicas del gobierno (Bertholini y Pereira 2017). El año 2017 fue testigo del elevado éxito del presidente Temer en esta tarea (Pereira 2017), hecho aún más impresionante dada la negativa coyuntura política, social y económica que caracterizó al país.…”
Section: Introductionunclassified