2018
DOI: 10.1609/aaai.v32i1.11511
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Partial Truthfulness in Minimal Peer Prediction Mechanisms With Limited Knowledge

Abstract: We study minimal single-task peer prediction mechanisms that have limited knowledge about agents' beliefs. Without knowing what agents' beliefs are or eliciting additional information, it is not possible to design a truthful mechanism in a Bayesian-Nash sense. We go beyond truthfulness and explore equilibrium strategy profiles that are only partially truthful. Using the results from the multi-armed bandit literature, we give a characterization of how inefficient these equilibria are comparing to truthful repor… Show more

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