2020
DOI: 10.1177/0160323x20986842
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Partisan Fractures in U.S. Federalism’s COVID-19 Policy Responses

Abstract: The comparatively poor U.S. response to COVID-19 was not due to federal inaction or a flawed federal system per se but to party polarization and presidential and gubernatorial preferences that frustrated federalism’s capacity to respond more effectively. The U.S. response is examined in terms of four models: coercive or regulatory federalism, nationalist cooperative federalism, non-centralized cooperative federalism, and dual federalism--finding that state-led dual federalism was the predominant response. The … Show more

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Cited by 19 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Underlying these dynamics is that federalism has served as a battleground for partisan warfare in recent years, which is part of a larger pattern of divergent policies across states. Specific to COVID-19, Democratic governors asserted their power, at least partially, as a political strategy to challenge the Trump White House, while Republican governors were wary of breaking from party doctrine set by the President (Goelzhauser and Rose 2017;Daguerre and Conlan 2020;Kettl 2020;Kincaid and Leckrone 2020;Fowler, Kettler, and Witt 2021).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Underlying these dynamics is that federalism has served as a battleground for partisan warfare in recent years, which is part of a larger pattern of divergent policies across states. Specific to COVID-19, Democratic governors asserted their power, at least partially, as a political strategy to challenge the Trump White House, while Republican governors were wary of breaking from party doctrine set by the President (Goelzhauser and Rose 2017;Daguerre and Conlan 2020;Kettl 2020;Kincaid and Leckrone 2020;Fowler, Kettler, and Witt 2021).…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Federal inaction has led states to evolve into key facilitators of sustainability policy adoption (Rabe 2002; Karch 2020). However, political, budgetary, and resource constraints frequently impose limitations on state actions (Karch 2020; Kincaid and Leckrone 2020). Therefore, states are starting to trend toward the devolution of sustainability policy implementation in an attempt to remove uncertainty from local-level policy commitments by employing coercive, cooperative, or mixed strategies that align state-level goals with local priorities (Feiock 2008).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pandemic required quick and decisive actions by governors across all states. Kincaid and Leckrone (2020) called these actions “unprecedented in U.S. history,” demonstrating that the police power of states remains potent. Governors exercised their power through executive orders that were often sweeping and sometimes controversial.…”
Section: Centralization and Preemptionmentioning
confidence: 99%