Party Responsiveness to the Collective Judgment of the Electorate

Abstract

Studies on retrospective voting argue that voters under presidentialism tend to assign co-responsibility for the president’s performance to her party in congressional elections. However, it is not uncommon for presidential parties to distance themselves from an unpopular president or for opposition parties to cooperate with a popular president. In doing so, parties can signal to voters that they side with a popular (or against an unpopular) president. Yet little is known about whether this strategic behavior has electoral payoffs. This study proposes a popularity-response model, where parties’ electoral outcomes are a product of how they respond to public opinion on the president. I hypothesize that parties defecting from an unpopular president (or cooperating with a popular president) minimize electoral losses and obtain a further electoral boost. Analysis using an original dataset coding issue congruence between presidents and parties prior to 35 elections in 18 Latin American countries supports this claim.

How the size of governing coalitions shape legislative behavior: A subnational analysis of Argentine legislative chambers, 1992–2009

“…If the executive exercises less control over legislators’ political careers or if legislators do not believe their legislative success is tied to the executive’s success, legislators may be less inclined to compensate for the executive’s compromised reputation. Instead, they may have a stronger incentive to go rogue—demonstrating that their preferences are distinct from those of the unpopular president (Lee, 2014). For example, in countries like the USA or Brazil, where party discipline pales in comparison to that of Argentina, legislators may respond to a weak executive by distancing themselves even further from the executive and tying their electoral fortunes solely to their personal vote.…”

Security, Clarity of Responsibility, and Presidential Approval

“…Finally, we also contribute to an expanding cross-national literature on performance accountability in Latin America (e.g., Carlin et al, 2014;De Ferrari, 2014;Gélineau, 2007;Johnson & Ryu, 2010;Johnson & Schwindt-Bayer, 2009;Lee, 2014;Lewis-Beck & Ratto, 2013;Pérez-Liñán, 2007;Singer, 2013;Singer & Carlin, 2013). Performance evaluations give us a window on the exercise of accountability throughout presidents' term in office by allowing us to connect changes in public opinion with changes in policy conditions.…”