Passive forward ownership and upstream collusion

Upstream collusion and corporate social responsibility in downstream competition

“…Since Bertrand price competition is more intense among firms than Cournot competition, firms in equilibrium will always choose greater product differentiation in order to release price competition. It is also different from Charistos et al (2022). However, our findings echo Bian et al (2018): Upstream collusion is easier to sustain under Cournot competition than Bertrand competition in the absence of CSR concern.…”

“…In summary, it shows that whether downstream CSR concerns hinder or facilitate upstream collusion hinges on the downstream competition mode. Specifically, CSR facilitates upstream collusion under downstream quantity competition which is different from Charistos et al (2022), but, indeed without CSR, upstream collusion is more difficult to be sustained. Bian et al (2018) also show that downstream CSR hinders upstream collusion when downstream firms engage in price competition.…”

“…They find that upstream collusion is easier to sustain under Cournot competition than Bertrand competition. Recently, Charistos et al (2022) consider a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with competing vertical chains, where each upstream firm has symmetric passive ownership over its downstream exclusive client. In a widely used linear demand, they show that passive forward ownership hinders upstream collusion.…”

“…5 5 Charistos et al (2022) consider a homogeneous Cournot duopoly with competing vertical chains, where each upstream firm has symmetric passive ownership over its downstream exclusive client.…”

Effects of partial passive ownership on the desirable production timing of the public utility in a mixed upstream market

“…For more real evidence, seeAzar et al (2018),Bayona and López (2018),Papadopoulos et al (2019),Fanti and Buccella (2021),Leonardos et al (2021), and.4 Reynolds and Snapp (1986) showed that PPO makes the market become less competitive with lower aggregate output and higher prices Li et al (2015). also showed that PPO can be an optimal strategy for incumbents to deter a potential entrant in an oligopoly whereasLiu et al (2018) pointed out that the anticompetitive effects of PPO are more complex with asymmetric technologies Charistos et al (2022). showed that passive forward ownership increases the sustainability of upstream collusion.5 Jain and Pal (2012),Cai andKarasawa-Ohtashiro (2015), andCho et al (2022) provided tangible evidence of PPO in mixed markets.6 As pioneering works on the endogenous timing choice with observable…”