2010
DOI: 10.7202/044299ar
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Penser le renouveau syndical par la sphère financière

Abstract: Tous droits réservés © Département des relations industrielles de l'Université Laval, 2010Ce document est protégé par la loi sur le droit d'auteur. L'utilisation des services d'Érudit (y compris la reproduction) est assujettie à sa politique d'utilisation que vous pouvez consulter en ligne.https://apropos.erudit.org/fr/usagers/politique-dutilisation/ Cet article est diffusé et préservé par Érudit.

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Cited by 3 publications
(2 citation statements)
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“…The third and most promising approach would have union-directed investment used in a much more interventionist way to leverage union power by influencing firm decision making, the organization of the labour process and labour relations, and in supporting unionized firms or sectors that are highly unionized (Coiquaud and Morissette, 2010;Webber, 2018). In this vein, unions may use the board representation that ownership affords to block anti-union practices or smooth accreditation, or to pass on proprietary information to workers and bargaining committees.…”
Section: Managing Workers Capitalmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…The third and most promising approach would have union-directed investment used in a much more interventionist way to leverage union power by influencing firm decision making, the organization of the labour process and labour relations, and in supporting unionized firms or sectors that are highly unionized (Coiquaud and Morissette, 2010;Webber, 2018). In this vein, unions may use the board representation that ownership affords to block anti-union practices or smooth accreditation, or to pass on proprietary information to workers and bargaining committees.…”
Section: Managing Workers Capitalmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The literature on 'managing workers' capital' has suggested multiple ways by which union pension trustees might better align their fiduciary duty to protect beneficiaries, on the one hand, and the interests of workers, local communities and unions on the other. The most commonly discussed are social investment screens which deselect firms or sectors that do not meet labour, environmental or ethical standards, and shareholder activism, where labour shareholders vote on 'good corporate governance' criteria that align with shareholder interests at annual meetings (Bauer et al, 2005;Clark and Hebb, 2004;Coiquaud and Morissette, 2010). Another, more likely avenue would have union trustees use their influence over pension fund governance to shift capital markets away from purely speculative activities, such as leveraged buyouts that shed labour and undermine employment quality (Applebaum and Batt, 2014;Baker and Fung, 2001) or shortterm asset trading that bears little or no relationship to the real economy and employment creation.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%