Performance results of the first White Rabbit installation for CNGS time transfer

Lipinski, Maciej; Włostowski, Tomasz; Serrano, J.; Alvarez, Pablo; Cobas, Juan David González; Rubini, Alessandro; Moreira, P

doi:10.1109/ispcs.2012.6336610

Cited by 33 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Note that the difference between the PPS signals in the reference and the silent case deviate by roughly 100ps. As typical WR synchronization accuracy is a few hundreds of picoseconds [19], Figure 5 confirms that synchronization accuracy is not compromised in the presence of the Delay Box in silent mode (with D = 0), and thus confirms that the Delay Box in silent mode is truly undetectable. Figure 6 shows the impact of the attack when the Delay Box is placed in the slave-to-master direction with D = D ⇤ ⇡ 4.98µs; Figure 7 shows the same attack with the Delay Box inserted in the opposite direction.…”

Section: B Attack Resultssupporting

confidence: 58%

Cyber-attack on packet-based time synchronization protocols: The undetectable Delay Box

Barreto

Suresh

Boudec

2016

2016 IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference Proceedings

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Abstract-We present a cyber-attack on packet-based time synchronization protocols (PBTSP) with high-accuracy requirements. The cyber-attack is undetectable from the PBTSP's perspective and exploits a vulnerability that is in the nature of all PBTSPs. It can be successfully performed regardless of the cryptographic protocol that the PBTSP is protected with and it is undetectable by the clock-servo algorithm inside the target slave clock. To perform this cyber-attack, we built a "Delay Box" capable of advancing or delaying a slave clock by introducing a malicious offset of a few microseconds. We run experimental tests to the delay box to prove the magnitude of the attack and to confirm undetectability. We discuss possible countermeasures for this type of attack.

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Section: B Attack Resultssupporting

confidence: 58%

Cyber-attack on packet-based time synchronization protocols: The undetectable Delay Box

Barreto

Suresh

Boudec

2016

2016 IEEE International Instrumentation and Measurement Technology Conference Proceedings

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“…Distance limitations and the specific network architecture to support the distribution of 1 microsecond timing accuracy continues to be an area of research. CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, has implemented a version of SyncE and PTP called White Rabbit that combines with measured equipment delays and measured asymmetries to provide sub-nanosecond time transfer over the CERN system [45]. The IEEE 1588 standard is currently undergoing an update that includes a high-accuracy option, which incorporates some of the White Rabbit technology [9].…”

Section: Synchronous Ethernet (Synce) With Ptpmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Framework for Cyber-Physical Systems: Volume 3, Timing Annex 45 • Alarming the human operator associated with the device; and • Enabling manual or automated switchover (failover) to an equally precise, trusted, backup timing source either internal or external to the device.…”

Section: Secure Time Use Cases Gps: Tripping Generators Off Of the Elmentioning

confidence: 99%

Framework for cyber-physical systems: volume 3, timing annex

Wollman¹,

Weiss²,

Li-Baboud³

et al. 2017

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“…In addition to it, a new independent system for timing distribution was deployed both at CERN and at LNGS. It is based on a recent, still under development, open source protocol, called "White Rabbit" (WR) [13], whose main purpose is to constantly and accurately monitor the propagation delay of any signal along the optical path, connecting all Nodes (PC's provided with WR hardware interface and running the WR protocol firmware) of the WR system. The WR system is expected to intrinsically correct for any change of the propagation chain delay, thus avoiding the need of periodic calibrations of the optical fibres described in the previous section.…”

Section: Additional Synchronization Between Cern and Lngsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Precision measurement of the neutrino velocity with the ICARUS detector in the CNGS beam

Antonello¹,

Baibussinov²,

Benetti³

et al. 2012

J. High Energ. Phys.

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During May 2012, the CERN-CNGS neutrino beam has been operated for two weeks for a total of ∼ 1.8 × 10 17 p.o.t., with the proton beam made of bunches, few ns wide and separated by 100 ns. This beam structure allows a very accurate time of flight measurement of neutrinos from CERN to LNGS on an event-by-event basis.Both the ICARUS-T600 PMT-DAQ and the CERN-LNGS timing synchronization have been substantially improved for this campaign, taking advantage of additional independent GPS receivers, both at CERN and LNGS as well as of the deployment of the "White Rabbit" protocol both at CERN and LNGS.The ICARUS-T600 detector has collected 25 beam-associated events; the corresponding time of flight has been accurately evaluated, using all different time synchronization paths.The measured neutrino time of flight is compatible with the arrival of all events with speed equivalent to the one of light: the difference between the expected value based on the speed of light and the measured value is δt = tof c −tof ν = 0.10±0.67 stat. ±2.39 syst. ns. This result is in agreement with the value previously reported by the ICARUS Collaboration, δt = 0.3 ± 4.9 stat. ± 9.0 syst. ns, but with improved statistical and systematic accuracy.

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Performance results of the first White Rabbit installation for CNGS time transfer

Cited by 33 publications

References 3 publications

Cyber-attack on packet-based time synchronization protocols: The undetectable Delay Box

Cyber-attack on packet-based time synchronization protocols: The undetectable Delay Box

Framework for cyber-physical systems: volume 3, timing annex

Precision measurement of the neutrino velocity with the ICARUS detector in the CNGS beam

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