Perpetual Voting: Fairness in Long-Term Decision Making

Lackner, Martin

doi:10.1609/aaai.v34i02.5584

Cited by 33 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…Contrary to this, we consider Approval ballots in addition to Plurality ballots and while our voters might change their preferences over time, our set of voters is static. In a more recent paper, Lackner [1] analyzes a similar PV setting developed independently. Lackner suggests several voting rules and analyze them via three axiomatic properties, as well as a quantitative evaluation by computer simulations.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting

et al. 2021

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We study the social choice setting of perpetual voting where, based on voter preferences, decisions have to be taken over a finite horizon of consecutive points in time (e.g, days). We consider two complementary settings: a Static setting, in which voter preferences remain static over time, and a Dynamic setting, in which voter preferences may change over time. We adapt the well-established Justified Representation and Proportional Justified Representation axioms, commonly used in the social choice literature, to perpetual voting, resulting in two axiomatic variants for the static setting and four variants for the dynamic setting. We show that all of the axioms are always satisfiable, and that simple preference aggregation methods can be used to satisfy the axioms in both cases. We then conduct a large human study (N = 190) aimed at identifying what potential voters (i.e., ordinary people) deem as desirable outcomes in simple perpetual voting settings. Our results show that approximately half of our participants consider different interpretations of fairness that correspond to our axiomatic framework. Taken jointly, our results can be used to help the research community identify appropriate aggregation methods to use in practice.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Then, employing Approval voting on a daily basis would mean that the group of colleagues would go to r 1 each day of the week, leaving v 3 constantly unhappy; there is not even a single day in which her preferences are taken into account. Following Lackner [1], we refer to this setting as Perpetual Voting (PV).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting

et al. 2021

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“…In their model there are no differences in cardinal intensities (x = 1 always) and occasional minority victories are defended as a goal in themselves. Lackner (2020) introduces an alternative class of mechanisms where a voter's current votes are weighted according to the voter's success in previous decisions. The mechanisms ensure a fair distribution of influence when voters vote sincerely.…”

Section: Storing and Distributing Votesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

Casella

Macé

2021

Annu. Rev. Econ.

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Voters have strong incentives to increase their influence by trading votes, acquiring others’ votes when preferences are strong in exchange for giving votes away when preferences are weak. But is vote trading welfare improving or welfare decreasing? For a practice long believed to be central to collective decisions, the lack of a clear answer is surprising. We review the theoretical literature and, when available, its related experimental tests. We begin with the analysis of logrolling, the exchange of votes for votes. We then focus on vote markets, where votes can be traded against a numeraire. We conclude with procedures allowing voters to shift votes across decisions—that is, allowing one to trade votes with oneself only. We find that vote trading and vote markets are typically inefficient; more encouraging results are obtained by allowing voters to allocate votes across decisions. Expected final online publication date for the Annual Review of Economics, Volume 13 is August 2021. Please see http://www.annualreviews.org/page/journal/pubdates for revised estimates.

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“…Another line of work (Conitzer et al 2017;Freeman et al 2017;Lackner 2020) is concerned with repeating elections, similar to Frege's proposal. These works, however, focus on fairness towards voters and discuss mechanisms that guarantee a fair distribution of utility among voters over time.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Mathematical Analysis of an Election System Proposed by Gottlob Frege

Harrenstein

Lackner

2020

Erkenn

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In 1998 a long-lost proposal for an election law by Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) was rediscovered in the Thüringer Universitäts- und Landesbibliothek in Jena, Germany. The method that Frege proposed for the election of representatives of a constituency features a remarkable concern for the representation of minorities. Its core idea is that votes cast for unelected candidates are carried over to the next election, while elected candidates incur a cost of winning. We prove that this sensitivity to past elections guarantees a proportional representation of political opinions in the long run. We find that through a slight modification of Frege’s original method even stronger proportionality guarantees can be achieved. This modified version of Frege’s method also provides a novel solution to the apportionment problem, which is distinct from all of the best-known apportionment methods, while still possessing noteworthy proportionality properties.

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Perpetual Voting: Fairness in Long-Term Decision Making

Cited by 33 publications

References 20 publications

Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting

Justified Representation for Perpetual Voting

Does Vote Trading Improve Welfare?

A Mathematical Analysis of an Election System Proposed by Gottlob Frege

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