Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates

Wright, Stephen; Riker, William H.

doi:10.1007/bf00149243

Cited by 98 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 23 publications

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“…We are instead interested to discuss this issue in a shorter term perspective, where pre-existing policy oriented parties bargain over policy under the two different electoral systems. Finally, Wright and Riker (1989) and Chamon et alts.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

2011

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

2011

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“…7 Wright and Riker (1989) present empirical evidence suggesting that the runoff systems tend to have a larger number of candidates. See also Cox (1997) for an analytical study of the Duverger's Hypothesis under the runoff rule.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 93%

The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

2010

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We consider the Hotelling-Downs model with n ≥ 2 office seeking candidates and runoff voting. We show that Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist and that there are typically multiple equilibria, both convergent (all candidates are located at the median) and divergent (candidates locate at distinct positions), though only divergent equilibria are robust to free entry. Moreover, two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of voters' ideal policies, while equilibria with more than two policies exist generically but under restrictive conditions that we characterize. In this sense, our analysis suggests that two-policy equilibria are the most prominent outcomes.

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“…A variety of researchers have found that runoffs encouraged candidate involvement during the one-party era of Southern politics (Canon 1978;Wright and Riker 1989;Berry and Canon 1993). Even with the emergence of the Republican Party in the early 1990s, the increased competitiveness of Southern primaries is still pronounced.…”

Section: Prior Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Runoff Voters Will Do the Darndest Things: An Analysis of the 2008 Georgia Democratic Senate Runoff

Buchanan¹

2012

ARP

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Testing the frontrunner loses myth and minority loses myth, this paper examines the 2008 Georgia Democratic Senate runoff between Vernon Jones and Jim Martin. Despite winning 40 per-cent of the primary vote, Jones lost in the runoff to Jim Martin. Methods: We use a variety of data to determine what factors were having the greatest effect on the election. Results: Vernon Jones's strongest support came from the rural counties of central and southern Georgia. While Jones did win high levels of support in counties with large black populations, the fact that Jones was not performing as well in counties in metro Atlanta highlights that controversies surrounding Jones may have been playing a larger role than race. Conclusions: The lack of black voter turnout in the runoff illustrates the problems that even a black candidate has in motivating black voters to return for the runoff.

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Plurality and runoff systems and numbers of candidates

Cited by 98 publications

References 23 publications

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round vs Runoff Elections Under Plurality Rule

The Hotelling-Downs Model with Runoff Voting

Runoff Voters Will Do the Darndest Things: An Analysis of the 2008 Georgia Democratic Senate Runoff

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