Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence From Russia and Ukraine

Abstract

A large literature attributes independent courts to intense political competition. Existing theories, however, have a previously unrecognized boundary condition— they apply only to consolidated democracies. This article proposes a strategic pressure theory of judicial (in)dependence in electoral democracies, which posits that intense political competition magnifies the benefits of subservient courts to incumbents, thus reducing rather than increasing judicial independence. The theory’s predictions are tested through quantitative analysis of electoral registration disputes adjudicated by Russian and Ukrainian courts during the 2002-2003 parliamentary campaigns. Selection models show that in Ukraine, progovernment candidates have a higher than average probability of winning in court, whereas in Russia the political affiliation of the plaintiff does not predict success at trial. Thus, the data show that judicial independence is lower in the more competitive electoral democracy (Ukraine) than in the less competitive electoral democracy (Russia).

Explaining Support for Human Rights Protections: A Judicial Role?

“…Our study suggests that the formula previously proposed (Domingo 2000;Iarczower et al 2002;Ramseyer and Rasmussen 2003;Chavez 2004), dispersal of political power, is the key factor. We note, however, that too much political competition in unconsolidated democracies can sometimes impede development of strong, independent judiciaries (Popova 2010(Popova : 1203). Yet, where executive and legislative powers are more equally deployed, judicial independence and human rights are more likely to thrive.…”

“…Therefore, viable judiciaries serve to "steer public authorities toward democratic manners and behavior in the exercise of power" (Nohlen 2009: 11) and to facilitate democratic consolidation. Although democracy can take various forms-representative democracies, participative ones (Nohlen 2009: 7) and electoral democracies (Popova 2010(Popova : 1203-not all will position courts in strong political positions, but representative-constitutional democracies are said to favor a strong judiciary with judicial review (Nohlen 2009: 21). Since there are no agreed upon measures of democracy (Coppedge and Gerring 2011), we chose to rely on legislative and executive parity and electoral competition to measure democratic vitality.…”

Judicial Politics in Unconsolidated Democracies: An Empirical Analysis of the Ecuadorian Constitutional Court (2008–2016)

“…Contrary to what is expected, certain conditions allow politicians to instrumentally use courts for circumventing constitutional limitations, while advancing their own policies and interests (Popova 2010). In this article, we particularly focus on the conditions under which courts will tend to favor the government.…”

“…By unconsolidated democracies we mean regimes in which minimal requirements for democracy are met but that lack institutionalization of democratic values (e.g., political parties are volatile, citizens as well as public officials have deep-rooted mistrust on democracy, and individual rights and liberties are 1 Still, fragmented governments may be able to control the judiciary, depending on certain institutional layouts (Popova 2010;Aydın 2013). For instance, Grijalva (2010, iv) evidenced that weak Ecuadorian legislative coalitions are able to influence constitutional justices under institutional conditions, such as "short terms in office, the threat of impeachment, and the possibility of reappointment."…”

“…For instance, Grijalva (2010, iv) evidenced that weak Ecuadorian legislative coalitions are able to influence constitutional justices under institutional conditions, such as "short terms in office, the threat of impeachment, and the possibility of reappointment." constantly threatened (Popova 2010)). In light of unconsolidated Latin American democracies, Helmke's departing point is that, under normal circumstances, courts are constrained by political actors, especially by the executive branch.…”