Politics, donors and the ineffectiveness of anti-corruption institutions in Uganda

Abstract

Elite corruption in Uganda constitutes an essential means of consolidating the present government in power. Political leaders have therefore shown little commitment to act to curb practices that could affect their political support. Instead, anti-corruption institutions have been influenced and controlled whenever they threatened to expose the corrupt ways of Uganda's state elites. Donors have also for many years been reluctant to use their substantial economic assistance to press the government to confront wrongdoing by state elites. They have not wanted to undermine a government which they have held up as one of the most successful in Africa in carrying out donor-sponsored economic reforms. But by giving large amounts of aid to a corrupt and quasi-authoritarian government, as well as being reticent in their public criticism of abuse of power and corruption, donors have abetted the actions of Uganda's leaders in weakening those bodies that could hold them responsible for abusing their public positions.

Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: an assessment

“…228 This is evident from donors' acceptance of elections that fall short of minimal standards (see Brown and Obi this collection 229 ), their clear preference for economic growth and political stability in the context of such 'donor darlings' as Museveni's Uganda (see Keating 230 this collection) 231 and Kagame's Rwanda (see Beswick 232 this collection), 233 and their marked reluctance to 'use their substantial economic assistance to press the government to confront wrongdoing by state elites', as in Uganda for instance. 234 Secondly, economic and political conditionality has limited the scope for policy debate 235 and thus political party differentiation. It has also rendered 'democratic' governments more accountable to the donor community than to local electorates 236 or to parliaments, with the experience of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) being 'one in which MPs have been expected to rubber-stamp documents written according to a standard template, despite the cosy discourse of African ownership'.…”

Developmental States in the New Millennium: Concepts and Challenges for a New Aid Agenda

“…Perverse effects can also occur at the macro level, if political trends are misunderstood. Large amounts of aid -and in particular aid provided through modalities preferable from a harmonisation and alignment perspective, such as general budget support -have been disbursed to some incumbent regimes even as their commitment to development was visibly waning (Tangri and Mwenda, 2006). One conclusion drawn by many from the problems associated with a technocratic approach is that donors ought to become more explicitly political in their work.…”

Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda

“…The IGG does possess prosecutorial powers but has been politically constrained Elite Corruption and Politics in Uganda 187 in exercising them. What appears evident is that the political executive has shown a clear interest in weakening and undermining those anti-corruption mechanisms that have sought to hold state leaders accountable for their misdeeds (Tangri & Mwenda, 2006). President Museveni continues to re-affirm his government's commitment to rid the country of corruption.…”