Politics, Markets, and Modes of Contract Governance: Regulating Social Services in Shanghai and Chongqing, China

Abstract

Inspired by the concept of the regulatory welfare state, this article identifies four primary modes of governance in regulating contract processes and contract implementation (market-based, hierarchical, professional, and relational), and compares contract governance modes in Shanghai and Chongqing. We find that the governments in these two localities prioritize and integrate the hierarchical and relational modes, relying less on the market-based and professional modes of governance. The emphasis on the hierarchical-relational mode advances the values and mechanisms of trust, adaptation, and alignment with top-down priorities, but may hinder public and legal accountability. We argue that the dynamics of political context and market condition affect the formation and effectiveness of hybrid modes of contract governance, and we advise that regulators in different countries should factor in such dynamics when designing contract governance modes in the regulation of social services.

Party‐led innovation of state‐sponsored intermediary organizations in Beijing, Shanghai, and Guangdong of China: Effects and managerial strategies

“…The study provides evidence of how the new mode of party leadership and state regulation (through state-sponsored IOs) affected SOs' managerial strategies. Consistent with previous ones, the study concludes that Xi Jinping government has permitted space for SOs' development and facilitated SOs' participation in service design and policy development (Hsu & Hasmath, 2014;Lam & Li, 2018;Li & Yang, 2020). The noncoercive mode of state-society interaction found in this study questions the assumption that one party-state is "authoritarian," namely coercive, in all of its action toward societal actors.…”

Contractual controls and pragmatic professionalism: A qualitative study on contracting social services in China

“…Kang (2019) found that by distributing competitive-based contracts, governments fostered reliable or trustworthy NGO partners because NGOs had to submit to the governments’ policy goals, such as delivering services instead of advocating rights, to secure contracts. Li and Yang (2020) discovered that a local Women's Federation in Shanghai prioritised the hierarchal account for sub-contracting and endorsed those contracting services that promoted ‘family harmony’, in line with the earlier instruction of the party's General Secretary Xi Jinping. Furthermore, a sub-district government in Shanghai even contracted out the highly political function of ‘party construction’ by commissioning NGOs to provide services for bonding retired party members (Jing and Hu, 2017).…”

“…The competitive-based nature of contracting social services has dramatically increased the number of SWOs from 1247 to 9793 between 2012 and 2018 (MCA, various years). Again, Chinese authorities may employ different strategies to control NGOs’ behaviour to ensure compliance with the state's interests rather than representing those of service users (Chan and Lei, 2017; Hildebrandt, 2013; Jing and Hu, 2017; Kang, 2019; Kang and Han, 2008; Li and Yang, 2020; Teets, 2014).…”

Autonomy and Coordinating Mechanisms of State-Society Boundary Organizations in Mainland China

“…Network mechanism relies on trust, negotiation and consensus-building to coordinate a wide range of actors endeavoring to identify common problems and interests, find shared values and common goals, share knowledge and contribute resources [29,[37][38][39][40] . Since building and sustaining trust requires long term interactions among participants, effective network mechanism brings about more stability and certainty than market mechanism does.…”