Possibility of non-institutional political participation within the non-responsive system of Serbia: The impact of (dis)trust and internal political efficiency

Abstract

Starting from the findings of previous studies, whose results speak of the distrust of Serbian citizens in political institutions and political actors, low turnout and general passivity and apathy of citizens, the authors deal with the understanding of non-institutional political participation in Serbia. The paper starts from the assumption that the stated indicators pointing to the withdrawal of Serbian citizens from political life do not necessarily represent part of the same phenomenon. Namely, the authors believe that it is necessary to distinguish between the assumptions of institutional and non-institutional civic participation. On the one hand, the authors start from the thesis that high trust in institutions can actually negatively affect the need of citizens to mobilize in order to influence institutions. At the same time, citizens may be inclined to participate in political life through non-institutional channels if they posses a developed sense of internal political efficiency, which is not necessary related to the responsiveness of the political system.

I’d Rather Bite My Tongue Off Than Stand with Them: Paralysis of Political Engagement in Serbia

“…Spasić is interested in exploring the contents of banal, everyday, common-sense discourse about politics in Serbian society. Her research, which is in its conclusions in line with other literature, shows that the citizens of Serbia came to consider the political sphere as a place of immorality, and while politicians are characterized, regardless of their differences, as necessarily evil (Gilbert et al 2008;Spasić 2013;Ilić 2014;Simić 2016;Fiket, Pavlović, Pudar Draško 2017;Lutovac 2017;Rajković 2017). This view of the political field is B M T O T S T 241…”

“…During that period, according to the Freedom House 2020 Report, Serbia has lost its status as a partially consolidated democracy, and is -for the first time since 2003 -included among hybrid regime countries (Kmezić, Bieber 2017;Kapidžić 2020;Freedom House 2022). For that reason, or in spite of it, the partial breakthrough of the paralysis manifested in numerous examples of collective public engagement that became a regular occurrence (Jarić, Živadinović 2012a;2012b;Pešić 2017a;Delibašić, Nikolić, Vasiljević 2019;Fiket et al 2019;Fiket, Pudar Draško 2021). However, even in changed circumstances, some elements of the paralysis of political engagement remained intact.…”

Big dreams and small steps: comparative perspectives on the social movement struggle for democracy in Serbia and North Macedonia

“…Another factor hampering the potential of social movements in Serbia from joining forces with other political actors and becoming a relevant political actor is the mentioned overall mistrust in politics, often described by citizens as 'a dirty business where no one can act and stay credible' (Fiket et al 2017). Some of this rhetoric has been appropriated by the movement members themselves, leading to a situation where many social movements are hesitant about getting involved in politics proper.…”

“…More recently, CESID (Centre for Free Elections and Democracy, Serbia) polls show even further deterioration of trust in political and nongovernmental organizations, with findings that only 11% of citizens trust political parties and 16% trust NGOs (Centar za Slobodne Izbore i Demokratiju (CeSID) 2017,35). A recent study (Fiket et al 2017) emphasized that citizens' attitudes and feelings towards politics and politicians in Serbia are most accurately described as loathing and contempt. Parties are seen as organizations whose sole function is to serve the interest of the corrupted elite, with no distinct ideology or values.…”

Potencijali i prepreke za transnacionalizaciju suvremenih ekoloških borbi u Srbiji

“…The turning point in the evolution of environmental movement and scaling-up of grassroots initiatives at national level happened, to a large part, precisely as a result of unfavourable political opportunity structures. In particular, due to the growing authoritarian tendencies over the past decade, coupled with unresponsiveness of different institutions to citizen's demands (Pešić et al, 2021) and democratic backsliding (Pavlović, 2020;Fiket and Pudar, 2021). In addition to chiefly middle-class urban initiatives against investor-led urbanism (Petrović and Backović, 2019) and occasional protests of workers, students and various groups affected by austerity measures after the Great Recession, a considerable boost to grassroot activism came as a result of putting claims over environmental issues.…”