Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions

Brannman, Lance

doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.1996.tb01407.x

Cited by 23 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…4 Using data on tree planting contract auctions, he tests the hypothesis that the bid function at standard first-price sealed-bid auctions within the IPVP monotonically decreases with N due to the competition effect. Brannman et al (1987) and Brannman (1996) also investigate the price effects of increased competition in various natural resource auctions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Iimi

2006

Rev Ind Organ

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Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements. Copyright Springer 2006competition effects, official development assistance, procurement auctions, C31, D44, H57, L31,

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Iimi

2006

Rev Ind Organ

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“…Brannman (1996) prices in open ascending price auctions and in first-price sealed-bid auctions. His results suggest that there is collusion in both auction formats.…”

Section: Collusion and Manipulationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Socio-Economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales

Marty¹,

Préget²

2010

Journal of Sustainable Forestry

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This socio-economic study aims to better understand the functioning and the evolution of timber sales held by the French public forest service. The auction system is the historical institution which has been used for timber sales in France for centuries. The recent trend to develop supply contracts through private agreements has a major impact on the French timber industry, which is criticized for its lack of competitiveness. It accurately raises questions about the timber price issue. Indeed, the auction system plays an important role in price setting. We refer to the auction theory literature to examine the features of French timber auctions: first-price sealed-bid sequential auctions of heterogeneous standing timber lots. In particular, we note that seller's reserve price is kept secret and that, contrary to the general assumption in auction theory, the seller indubitably lacks information about his own reservation value. Finally, the difficulty of defining a "fair market price" remains a central issue in public timber sales.

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“…The use of regression analysis to predict stumpage rates originates with Steer and Guttenberg (1938), who used multiple regression analysis to relate timber stand characteristics to stumpage values. Over time, regression analysis was used not only to relate timber stand characteristics to stumpage value, but also to examine the effect of competition and auction design on bids (e.g., Mead, Schniepp and Watson 1983;Brannman 1996). The DOC recommended the use of TEA because the U.S.…”

Section: Greater Openness In the Setting Of Stumpage Fees: A Way Out?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Resolving Canada-US Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber

Biggs¹,

Laaksonen-Craig²,

Niquidet³

et al. 2006

Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques

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Prominent trade disputes between Canada and the U.S. involve agriculture and forestry, with lack of transparency caused by Canadian non-market institutions a source of U.S. objections. Though there has been a recent flurry of activity in the binational dispute resolution panel on Canadian exports of wheat, one of every six panels since 1989 has involved softwood lumber. We examine lessons from the lumber dispute to shed light on U.S. objections to the Canadian Wheat Board (CWB). We argue that U.S. lumber lobbyists will continue to use perceived Canadian institutional obscurity to keep pressure on policymakers, while the CWB system enables similar agricultural interests in to agitate for trade sanctions. Traditional strategies such as dispute resolution boards, appeals to the WTO, and bilateral policy reform can only buy Canada time-new strategies are needed if Canada is to maintain sovereignty over its trade institutions.

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Potential Competition and Possible Collusion in Forest Service Timber Auctions

Cited by 23 publications

References 16 publications

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

A Socio-Economic Analysis of French Public Timber Sales

Resolving Canada-US Trade Disputes in Agriculture and Forestry: Lessons from Lumber

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