Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

Svolik, Milan W.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.860744

Cited by 112 publications

(176 citation statements)

References 38 publications

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“…We also know, however, that members of the ruling elite constitute the first major threat to dictators (Geddes 1999;Svolik 2009). Dictators, in fact, are frequently deposed by a fellow member of the regime.…”

Section: Monarchic Military and Civilian Dictatorshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

2009

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We address the strengths and weaknesses of the main available measures of political regime and extend the dichotomous regime classification first introduced in Alvarez et al. (Stud. Comp. Int. Dev. 31(2):3-36 1996). This extension focuses on how incumbents are removed from office. We argue that differences across regime measures must be taken seriously and that they should be evaluated in terms of whether they (1) serve to address important research questions, (2) can be interpreted meaningfully, and (3) are reproducible. We argue that existing measures of democracy are not interchangeable and that the choice of measure should be guided by its theoretical and empirical underpinnings. We show that the choice of regime measure matters by replicating studies published in leading journals

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Section: Monarchic Military and Civilian Dictatorshipsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

2009

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“…6 Naturally, the challenger can only succeed the incumbent once the supreme commander SC has given up his loyalty to the incumbent. The latter, however, will do so only if he sees a better future for himself as the supreme commander under the challenger CH rather than under the incumbent (Svolik 2009). Had that already been the case prior to the mass protests, though, then he would have been free to change loyalty before.…”

Section: Public Risings and Revolutionary Elitesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship

Apolte

2016

Const Polit Econ

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We assess Gordon Tullock's work on revolutions and dictatorship using a common analytical framework that captures the dynamics of mutually reinforcing perceptions within a potentially rebelling subgroup of a population. We can reconstruct all of Tullock's central findings but we also find him failing to consider revolutions as an unintended result of individual action in certain low-cost situations. That notwithstanding, one central implication of Tullock's analysis remains intact, namely that no relation can consistently be constructed between the degree of deprivation of a population on the one hand and the probability of an enforced regime change in a public uprising, at least not within the limits of methodological individualism. Hence, whoever aims at strictly inferring macro results from micro behavior must still find Tullock's work on autocracies and revolutions pathbreaking.

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“…In this literature, some focus on the threat of coups by the selectorate (Bueno de Mesquita et al, 2003;Besley and Kudamatsu, 2008;Egorov and Sonin, 2011;Svolik, 2009Svolik, , 2012Gilli and Li, 2013). Others focus on the threat of revolution by the citizens (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006;Svolik, 2013;Aidt and Jensen, 2014;Gilli and Li, 2014;Dorsch and Maarek, 2015).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) refer to these key backers as the 'selectorate', concluding that a larger size of the selectorate is associated with a higher level of public goods provided by the government. Svolik (2009Svolik ( , 2012 refers to these key backers as the 'ruling coalition'. This literature, typically, assumes that all dictators share the same primary goal: to hold on to office at all costs because failing to do so will result in imprisonment, exile, or execution.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies

Gilli

2015

European Journal of Political Economy

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Power-Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes

Cited by 112 publications

References 38 publications

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

Democracy and dictatorship revisited

Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship

Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies

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