Precise Long-Range Weapons in Europe: Problems of Limitation and Control
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Cited by 4 publications
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The purpose of this article is to analyze and prepare specific recommendations on key, but still unresolved, topical issues of arms control in Europe. The recommendations, in particular, include the further prevention of the deployment of new medium- and shorter-range missiles, non-strategic ("tactical") nuclear weapons, as well as the identification of prospects for limiting the conventional arms race and issues of means to prevent dangerous military incidents. In this regard, the article analyzes a promising set of measures for creating a mutual system of European security and resolving a number of key problems in this area through the prism of the issues of the INF Treaty, TNW and other international documents and treaties, suggests concrete steps and ways of effective implementation in this direction. The article used systematic, retrospective, comparative, hermeneutic methods of scientific research. The novelty of the approach lies in the fact that the article does this in the context of an analysis of the aggravation of the situation around Ukraine, its attempts to join NATO and Russian demands to the United States and NATO on the need for legally binding guarantees of mutual security made in November-December 2021. The six concrete steps proposed by the authors towards arms control in Europe, as well as a set of measures in the field of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, consisting of twelve points, are also innovative. The authors focus on the need to reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads and their placement, eliminate certain classes of non-strategic nuclear weapons, exchange information on the types and number of delivery systems of non-strategic nuclear warheads, formalize obligations not to dock non-strategic nuclear warheads with their delivery systems, as well as obligations not to exceed the aggregate limit on non-strategic and non-deployed strategic warheads, conduct periodic mutual on-site inspections. The authors see promising measures to create a flexible and constructive security architecture in the European region in the intensification of both diplomatic and military dialogue between Russia and NATO, in the formation of legally fixed measures to prevent the threat of mutual military clashes, in the resumption of joint work on cooperation in airspace and in marine areas, in the development of new procedures for de-escalation military incidents and conflicts. The practical and theoretical significance of the work lies in the systematic analysis of a set of important security measures on the European continent after a fundamental change in the world security system, including the termination of almost all international arms control agreements. This was especially relevant already at the beginning of 2022 in the situation of Russia conducting a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and increasing the likelihood of a military nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and prepare specific recommendations on key, but still unresolved, topical issues of arms control in Europe. The recommendations, in particular, include the further prevention of the deployment of new medium- and shorter-range missiles, non-strategic ("tactical") nuclear weapons, as well as the identification of prospects for limiting the conventional arms race and issues of means to prevent dangerous military incidents. In this regard, the article analyzes a promising set of measures for creating a mutual system of European security and resolving a number of key problems in this area through the prism of the issues of the INF Treaty, TNW and other international documents and treaties, suggests concrete steps and ways of effective implementation in this direction. The article used systematic, retrospective, comparative, hermeneutic methods of scientific research. The novelty of the approach lies in the fact that the article does this in the context of an analysis of the aggravation of the situation around Ukraine, its attempts to join NATO and Russian demands to the United States and NATO on the need for legally binding guarantees of mutual security made in November-December 2021. The six concrete steps proposed by the authors towards arms control in Europe, as well as a set of measures in the field of limitation and reduction of conventional weapons in Europe, consisting of twelve points, are also innovative. The authors focus on the need to reduce the number of non-strategic nuclear warheads and their placement, eliminate certain classes of non-strategic nuclear weapons, exchange information on the types and number of delivery systems of non-strategic nuclear warheads, formalize obligations not to dock non-strategic nuclear warheads with their delivery systems, as well as obligations not to exceed the aggregate limit on non-strategic and non-deployed strategic warheads, conduct periodic mutual on-site inspections. The authors see promising measures to create a flexible and constructive security architecture in the European region in the intensification of both diplomatic and military dialogue between Russia and NATO, in the formation of legally fixed measures to prevent the threat of mutual military clashes, in the resumption of joint work on cooperation in airspace and in marine areas, in the development of new procedures for de-escalation military incidents and conflicts. The practical and theoretical significance of the work lies in the systematic analysis of a set of important security measures on the European continent after a fundamental change in the world security system, including the termination of almost all international arms control agreements. This was especially relevant already at the beginning of 2022 in the situation of Russia conducting a special military operation on the territory of Ukraine and increasing the likelihood of a military nuclear conflict between Russia and NATO.
New Trends in the Procurement and Use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
Based on the presented classification of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the specifics of their use in modern conflicts are examined. The main trends in the procurement of UAVs are analyzed. It is indicated that the use of UAVs in combat is not limited to the functions of reconnaissance, target designation and strikes, as well as the detection and destruction of terrorist groups, as was the case in Afghanistan and Iraq conflicts. Thе UAVs are increasingly used within the framework of reconnaissance and strike complexes on the battlefield. The RD and production of small and mini-drones, as well as of unmanned aerial vehicles capable of remaining invulnerable to air defense systems, are actively developing. Other modern technologies of unmanned systems are being advanced. Due to the fact that in recent years the trend of massive use of small and mini-UAVs in conflicts has prevailed, supplies to the armed forces of various countries of heavy and a number of medium (tactical) high-altitude and medium-altitude drones are decreasing, while the purchases of small drones, as well as light civilian UAVs with reconfigured software, are increasing.
On the Security Dilemma and Threats of Escalation in the Context of Finland’s and Sweden’s Joining to NATO
The aim of the article is to study the military security trends on the ‘northern flank’ of the confrontation between Russia and the collective West. The relevance of this work is due to the further expansion of NATO to the East, expressed in the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance and, accordingly, the creation of new threats. In the conditions of continuing high-intensity armed conflict in the middle of Europe, NATO’s actions can be seen as part of the measures to impose costs on the Russian Federation and stretch the perimeter of its deterrence capabilities. The article also considers the problem of materialisation of perceived threats in the form of practical steps in the field of military development leading to an ‘escalation vortex’, and suggests directions of possible negative consequences minimisation for national and international security because of NATO actions. For response measures, it is proposed to take into account the limited (primarily mobilisation and military-technical) resources (currently more crucial to fulfill the tasks of the Special Military Operation), as well as to limit escalation threats under the situation of intensive security dilemma implementation.
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