Presidential Environmental Appointees in Comparative Perspective

Abstract

The pathologies of the presidential appointment process are well documented and include appointees’ frequent lack of federal government work experience and their short appointment tenures. Less well understood are whether and to what extent these problems affect different subsets of high‐level appointees, such as administrators in the environmental bureaucracy. Top‐tier environmental appointees tend to stay longer in their appointed positions than do presidential appointees generally, and more than 40 percent have prior federal government management experience. These and other data suggest that key problems ascribed to the presidential appointment process are less salient in the case of high‐level environmental appointees. Appointees in Republican and Democratic administrations have comparable levels of academic training and federal government experience. These similarities notwithstanding, White House expectations for appointees’ political loyalty varies more from administration to administration. The Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush (first term) administrations maintained the highest demands for political loyalty, with consequences for the policy–administration dichotomy in environmental agencies.

Exploring the Determinants of the Entry and Exit of Ministers inKorea: 1980–2008

“…The president selects the best of the viable ministerial candidates who can execute his or her policy orientation at the departmental level. Sometimes, political loyalty and campaign contributions are the most important criteria for the selection of ministers; the Reagan administration was a clear example (Auer ). In contrast, in selecting experts to be ministers, the president assesses candidates in terms of their competence, credibility, and loyalty (Lee, Moon, and Hahm ; Mackenzie ).…”

The Contemporary Presidency: Gender Desegregation and Gender Integration in the President's Cabinet, 1933-2010

“…Yet this outreach also strains the secretaries' allegiance to the president, as members of Congress advance their own priorities through authorizations and appropriations, departmental careerists mobilize to protect their programs, and constituencies seek policies in their self‐interest. Acknowledging these pressures, among others, presidents have centralized decision making in the White House and chosen secretaries who share their ideologies and priorities (Hult 2003; Hult and Walcott 2004; Lewis 2008; Pfiffner 2009, 2010; Warshaw 1996; Weko 1995; see also Auer 2008).…”

Rethinking Loyalty and Competence in Presidential Appointments

“…Developing continuous measures of loyalty and competence is critical since many studies contend that at least some level of competence is required in presidential appointments (Aberbach and Rockman ; Epstein and O'Halloran ; Gailmard and Patty ; Huber and McCarty ; Lewis ; Nathan ; Waterman ; Wood and Waterman ). Auer () notes that there are variations from administration to administration with regard to the preference for loyalty (though he only examines environmental appointments). If we treat the loyalty‐competence nexus as a mere binary choice, presidents only have a choice between rewarding loyalty/responsiveness or competence.…”