Principal–agent approach to energy executive compensation design

Bocharova, I.; Rymanov, Alexander

doi:10.1016/j.egyr.2022.01.030

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

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“…Two, due to the essentiality and sensitivity of banking operations in an economy, banks always compete to secure and retain the services of skillful and talented CEOs. This competition tends to spur executive compensation packages and incentives of one bank to influence that of others in the industry (Bocharova & Rymanov, 2022). This portrays that banks' executive compensation contracts are not independent, as it is implicitly assumed in the existing research (Olaniyi et al, 2022; Olaniyi et al, 2023).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Do the same executive compensation strategies and policies fit all the firms in the banking industry? New empirical insights from the CEO pay–firm performance causal nexus

Olaniyi

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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This study introduces the roles of firms' intertwining and policy variations across firms in the CEO pay–bank performance causal relationships in Nigeria, using the Dumitrescu–Hurlin panel Granger non‐causality test and second‐generation estimators. The findings reveal that banks' interdependence, diverse strategies, and policies vary across banks. In 11 banks, CEO pay is not a reward for bank performance or an incentive to perform. Meanwhile, two banks utilize performance‐based pay for their CEOs, while the remaining two adopt CEO pay as a performance motivator. The study concludes that firms' interdependence and policy variations across firms influence the CEO pay–bank performance nexus.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%