Privacy Preserving Query Processing on Secret Share Based Data Storage

Tian, Xin; Sha, Chaofeng; Wang, Xiaoling; Zhou, Aoying

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-20149-3_10

Cited by 14 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…However, it provides no attack description, and argues that large primes are prohibitively expensive to recover. Our attack recovers 8192-bit primes in less time than [5] needed to recover 32-bit primes. In fact, we can generally recover large primes in less time than the client takes to generate them (Sect.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Our contribution is to demonstrate that all three HAT schemes [3][4][5] fail to fulfill Claim 2. We give a practical attack that can reconstruct all secrets in the database when k servers collude, even when p and X are kept private.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The TSWZ scheme [5] argues that if p is known, secrets could be recovered. However, it provides no attack description, and argues that large primes are prohibitively expensive to recover.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Three recent works [3][4][5] propose outsourcing schemes based on Shamir's secret sharing algorithm [6] instead of encryption. We refer to these works by their authors' initials, HJ [3], AAEMW [4], and TSWZ [5], and in aggregate as the HAT schemes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We refer to these works by their authors' initials, HJ [3], AAEMW [4], and TSWZ [5], and in aggregate as the HAT schemes. The AAEMW scheme was also published in [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security Limitations of Using Secret Sharing for Data Outsourcing

Dautrich

Ravishankar

2012

Data and Applications Security and Privacy XXVI

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Abstract. Three recently proposed schemes use secret sharing to support privacy-preserving data outsourcing. Each secret in the database is split into n shares, which are distributed to independent data servers. A trusted client can use any k shares to reconstruct the secret. These schemes claim to offer security even when k or more servers collude, as long as certain information such as the finite field prime is known only to the client. We present a concrete attack that refutes this claim by demonstrating that security is lost in all three schemes when k or more servers collude. Our attack runs on commodity hardware and recovers a 8192-bit prime and all secret values in less than an hour for k = 8.

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Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The TSWZ scheme [5] argues that if p is known, secrets could be recovered. However, it provides no attack description, and argues that large primes are prohibitively expensive to recover.…”

Section: Our Contributionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We refer to these works by their authors' initials, HJ [3], AAEMW [4], and TSWZ [5], and in aggregate as the HAT schemes. The AAEMW scheme was also published in [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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