Private and public self-consciousness and articulation of the self-schema.

Nasby, William

doi:10.1037/0022-3514.56.1.117

Cited by 55 publications

(54 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Test-retest reliability at 2 weeks ranged from .73 to .84 (Fenigstein et al, 1975). More recent research has confirmed that the SCS is reliable (e.g., Mittal & Balasubramanian, 1987) and valid (e.g., Nasby, 1989;Schlenker & Weigold, 1990).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The social self in bulimia nervosa: Public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and perceived fraudulence.

Striegel‐Moore¹,

Silberstein²,

Rodin³

1993

Journal of Abnormal Psychology

143

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Bulimic women appear preoccupied not only with their physical presentation but also with their "social self-how others perceive them in general. This study examined the relationship of the social self to body esteem and to bulimia nervosa. In Phase 1, in which 222 nonclinical women (aged 16 to 50) participated, the social-self measures of Perceived Fraudulence, Social Anxiety, and Public Self-Consciousness were negatively associated with body esteem. In Phase 2, 34 bulimic women were compared with 33 Ss scoring high on the Eating Attitudes Test (EAT) and 67 matched control. Bulimic Ss, high-EAT Ss, and control Ss all differed on Perceived Fraudulence, and bulimic Ss and high-EAT Ss scored higher than control Ss on Public Self-Consciousness and Social Anxiety. The findings strongly support the hypothesized link of social-self concerns to body dissatisfaction and bulimia nervosa.A central symptom of eating disorders is preoccupation with appearance-a constant concern with how the physical self is viewed by others. Beneath this manifest symptom seems to lie a pervasive concern with how others view the self in general. Eating disordered patients appear preoccupied with self-presentation and with how others perceive and evaluate them, a facet of the self first designated the "social self" by William James (1890/1983).'Research suggests that women with bulimia nervosa and anorexia nervosa experience significant difficulties in the area of social adjustment, characterized by social anxiety, impoverished relationships, and social isolation (

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 95%

The social self in bulimia nervosa: Public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and perceived fraudulence.

Striegel‐Moore¹,

Silberstein²,

Rodin³

1993

Journal of Abnormal Psychology

143

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“…Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1984;Linville & Carlston, 1994;Nasby, 1989). Specifically, we question the assumption that personal self-schemas always functionally control how we process self-relevant information and thus govern self-conception in the schema-relevant domain.…”

Section: The Present Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fluidity in the self‐concept: the shift from personal to social identity

Onorato¹,

Turner²

2004

Euro J Social Psych

293

160

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Dominant personality models of the self-concept (e.g. self-schema theory) conceive of the self as a relatively stable cognitive representation or schema. The self-schema controls how we process selfrelevant information across a myriad of situations. Conversely, self-categorization theory argues that self-perception is highly variable and context-dependent. It was hypothesized in two studies (N ¼ 114 and 200) that the effect of personal self-schemas on information-processing would be eliminated when the context makes a conflicting higher-order identity salient. Results largely supported selfcategorization theory. Across various dependent measures (trait endorsements, response latencies, and confidence in self-descriptions), participants generally responded in line with the salient identity, even if this pattern of responding directly contradicted their personal self-schema. Implications for dominant personality models of the self-concept are examined. Copyright # 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. This paper examines the nature of the self-concept, in particular whether the self is a fluid or stable entity. The fluidity issue is addressed by comparing and contrasting two influential theories of the self, namely self-schema theory (Markus, 1977(Markus, , 1990) and self-categorization theory (Turner, 1999;Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994). On the one hand, self-schema theory and social cognition models more generally ascribe a great deal of stability to the self-system. On the other hand, selfcategorization theory conceptualizes the self as a highly dynamic process. The present research extends previous work in both research traditions. In two related studies we test whether selfperception is a context-dependent process, or the manifestation of enduring personality traits or selfschemas. SELF-SCHEMA THEORYSelf-schema theory maintains that the core self comprises our self-schemas-'knowledge structures developed by individuals to understand and explain their own social experiences' (Markus & Sentis, 1982, p. 45). It is assumed that we develop these self-structures for our most centrally-defining attributes. For one person independence may be a centrally-defining attribute, while for another creativity or extroversion may be central (Markus, 1977;Markus & Sentis, 1982). Self-schemas are stable self-representations; they facilitate information-processing such that individuals quickly accept congruent information and reject incongruent information (Markus, 1977). Despite the theory's initial emphasis on stability, self-schema theorists later sought to render the model more dynamic by introducing the concept of a working self-concept (Markus & Nurius, 1986;Markus & Wurf, 1987). The working self was conceived as a temporary structure that contains one's currently active self-aspect. Moreover, the malleability of the self-system was attributed to the varying accessibility of self-aspects that surround the core elements (Markus & Kunda, 1986). Thus the revised model retained the idea that self-schemas are sta...

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“…For example, individuals high in private self-consciousness (a) write more detailed self-descriptions (Turner, 1978b), (b) decide more quickly whether trait adjectives describe the self (Mueller, 1982;Turner, 1978c), (c) recall more self-referent material under conditions of incidental learning (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984;Hull & Levy, 1979, Experiment 1;Turner, 1980), and (d) commit more false alarms to self-descriptive traits but fewer to non-self-descriptive traits during a recognition memory task (Nasby, 1985(Nasby, , 1989) than do individuals low in private self-consciousness.…”

Section: William Nasbymentioning

confidence: 99%

Private self-consciousness, self-awareness, and the reliability of self-reports.

Nasby

1989

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Self Cite

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Two studies found that individuals high in private self-consciousness provide self-reports of greater reliability across time than individuals low in private self-consciousness. In addition, Study 2 found that a successful manipulation of self-awareness did not affect test-retest reliability of self-reports among Ss either high or low in private self-consciousness. The hypothesis that individuals high in private self-consciousness have articulated self-schemata of greater temporal stability than individuals low in private self-consciousness received support. The discussion considers (a) how private selfconsciousness, but not self-awareness, influenced test-retest reliability of self-reports, (b) how private self-consciousness and self-awareness may both influence, albeit differentially, the eriterionrelated validity of self-reports, and (c) the possibility that current models of self-consciousness-selfawareness require reformulation.Private self-consciousness (e.g., Fenigstein, scheier, & Buss, 1975), a cognitive style, denotes habitual attentiveness to or awareness of the self. Since Fenigstein et al. (1975) originally proposed the construct, research has examined numerous correlates of private self-consciousness, which Buss (1980), Carver and Scheier (1981), and scheier and Carver (1983) have reviewed.Not surprisingly, several correlates pertain to the processing of self-referent information. For example, individuals high in private self-consciousness (a) write more detailed self-descriptions (Turner, 1978b), (b) decide more quickly whether trait adjectives describe the self (Mueller, 1982;Turner, 1978c), (c) recall more self-referent material under conditions of incidental learning (Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984; Hull & Levy, 1979, Experiment 1;Turner, 1980), and (d) commit more false alarms to self-descriptive traits but fewer to non-self-descriptive traits during a recognition memory task (Nasby, 1985(Nasby, , 1989) than do individuals low in private self-consciousness.The previous studies have established relations between private self-consciousness and either the accuracy or the efficiency (e.g., speed, productivity) of processing self-referent information. Cognitive tasks that assess either accuracy or efficiency provide two means of inferring the degree to which an articulated schema has guided performance (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984; Kihlstrom & Nasby, 1981;Nasby & Kihlstrom, 1986). Consequently, from the convergent results of the previous studies, several investigators (e.g., Agatstein & Buchanan, 1984;Nasby, 1985) have concluded that individuals high in private self-consciousness have articulated self-schemata (e.g., Kihlstrom & Cantor, 1983;Markus, 1980;Rogers, 1981) 950third means of inferring the degree to which an articulated schema has guided performance (e.g., Fiske & Taylor, 1984;Markus, 1977). Considering the relation between schematic articulation and response consistency, individuals high in private self-consciousness should also process self-referent information more consistently than do i...

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Private and public self-consciousness and articulation of the self-schema.

Cited by 55 publications

References 22 publications

The social self in bulimia nervosa: Public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and perceived fraudulence.

The social self in bulimia nervosa: Public self-consciousness, social anxiety, and perceived fraudulence.

Fluidity in the self‐concept: the shift from personal to social identity

Private self-consciousness, self-awareness, and the reliability of self-reports.

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