Programmatic Politics and Voter Preferences: The 2017 Election in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta

This article seeks to contribute an understanding of how populism informs incumbency disadvantages in elections. Incumbency has been seen as highly beneficial in elections, and many studies have found that incumbent candidates enjoy significant access to resources with which they can campaign. This article, however, finds a different reality, with incumbents in Banda Aceh and Takalar experiencing electoral defeat. In both areas, extensive field studies before and after the local elections found that incumbents’ unwillingness to adopt a populist approach during their terms influenced voters’ choices. The main argument of this article is that, in Indonesia’s local democracies, incumbency has created space for varied models of populism, including the communitarian populism found in Aceh and Takalar. Such populism has emerged from specific socio-cultural contexts at the local level that have shaped voters’ preferences. The socio-cultural context of communal societies such as Aceh and Takalar has informed the truth value through which elites, policies, and phenomena are judged. Ultimately, this communitarian populism cannot be separated from the public’s desires for elections. These two cases offer a profile of how communitarian societies respond to and shape local populism in Indonesia.

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 54%

Incumbency Disadvantages and Populism in Indonesian Local Elections: Case Studies of Banda Aceh and Takalar

Nurlinah

Darwin

Haryanto

2019

“…6 Money politics does not only occur in national and local politics; it is also rampant in villagelevel elections throughout the country (Aspinall & Rohman, 2017;Fitriyah, 2015;Halili, 2009). It is rare for studies to explore how Indonesians attempt to avoid money politics, with one of the few exceptions being an investigation of the village chief elections in Kulon Progo, Yogyakarta by Mas'udi & Kurniawan (2017), which found that the practice of money politics could be prevented with programmatic policymaking.…”

Section: The Inevitability Of Transactional Politics?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Several means of ending the practice of money politics have been discussed in the literature. First is programmatic politics (Mas'udi & Kurniawan, 2017;Wyatt, 2013), which involves the (re) distribution of public goods to all citizens-no matter who they voted for (Stokes, 2007); as such, inclusivity is key. Conversely, in money politics, cash and goods are distributed solely to citizens who voted for a candidate or party.…”

Section: The Inevitability Of Transactional Politics?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, in money politics, cash and goods are distributed solely to citizens who voted for a candidate or party. In their study of the 2017 local election in Kulon Progo, Mas'udi & Kurniawan (2017) showed that candidates can use programmatic politics to eliminate vote buying and clientelism, as this approach can help citizens escape the cycle of money politics.…”

Section: The Inevitability Of Transactional Politics?mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Breaking the Chains of Transactionalism: A Village Election without Money Politics in Panggungharjo

Bayo

Santoso

2019

The logic of corruption has seemingly been accepted as a normal part of democratic practices. This article challenges this logic, referring to the successful example of Panggungharjo, a village on the outskirts of Yogyakarta.[1]Without romanticising this village and its experiences, this article seeks to show the decisions and steps necessary for realising change and breaking the chains of transactionalism. Change is only possible if both the supply of and demand for money politics are cut off. Transformation is only possible when changes occur in supply and demand. In other words, transactionalism can only be avoided in electoral politics when a shift in demand coincides with the stigmatisation of transactional practices.[1] Administratively, Panggungharjo is part of Bantul Regency. However, it is sociologically a sub-urban part of Yogyakarta City.

“…Studies of patronage and clientelism as electoral strategies in Indonesia have been widely conducted by academics (Allen, 2015;Aspinall, 2013;Aspinall & Berenschot, 2019;Fionna, 2014;Mas'Udi & Kurniawan, 2017;Sukmajati & Aspinal, 2014;Tans, 2012). However, most of these studies have examined the reciprocal relationships between politicians and voters within executive and legislative elections at the national and regional level.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Paradox of Incumbency: Patronage, Clientelism, and Incumbent Defeat in Village Chief Elections

Abheseka

2019

This article examines the practices of patronage and clientelism during village elections. Examining Mekarsari Village, Yogyakarta, this study finds that patronage strategies such as programmatic politics, vote buying, club goods, and individual gifts were used by all candidates during village elections owing to the lack of strong social bonds between candidates and voters. The incumbent with all advantages and access to material resources also used patronise and clientelism as strategy, but in fact, it cannot guarantee they win the election. This suggests that the societal relationships and practices of patronage and clientelism continue to affect voter’s preference. Applying sociological, psychological, and rational approaches to understanding voter behaviour especially in Java, the study found that, apart from the instrumental and social distance considerations, territorial representation also influenced voter’s preference at Village.