Propositional reasoning by model.

Johnson‐Laird, P. N.; Byrne, Ruth M. J.; Schaeken, Walter

doi:10.1037/0033-295x.99.3.418

Cited by 393 publications

(325 citation statements)

References 45 publications

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“…Individuals are able to reason from such assertions; and the theory of mental models -henceforth, the ''model'' theory -offers an account of how they do so (see, e.g., Johnson-Laird, 2006;Johnson-Laird & Byrne, 1991;Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992). The logical meaning of the assertion above can be represented in a truth table, as shown in Table 2.…”

Section: Models Of Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental models of Boolean concepts

Goodwin

Johnson‐Laird

2011

Cognitive Psychology

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a b s t r a c tNegation, conjunction, and disjunction are major building blocks in the formation of concepts. This article presents a new model-based theory of these Boolean components. It predicts that individuals simplify the models of instances of concepts. Evidence corroborates the theory and challenges alternative accounts, such as those based on minimal descriptions, algebraic complexity, or structural invariance. A computer program implementing the theory yields more accurate predictions than these rival accounts. Two experiments showed that the numbers of models of a Boolean concept predict the difficulty of formulating a description of it. As mental models may also underlie deductive reasoning, the present theory integrates two hitherto separate areas of investigation.

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Section: Models Of Conceptsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental models of Boolean concepts

Goodwin

Johnson‐Laird

2011

Cognitive Psychology

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“…Generally speaking, the theories of human deductive reasoning have split along a dimension that is similar to, but not identical with, the syntactic v. model-theoretic distinc-tion in AI. On the one hand, mental-model theories of the type proposed by Johnson-Laud and colleagues (Johnson-Laird, Byrne, & Schaeken, 1992;Johnson-Laud & Byrne, 1991) hold that a person reasons from particular semantic interpretations (models) of sentences such as p-+q and either p or q.4 In this framework, a reasoner identifies or validates a particular conclusion by manipulating and comparing these models. On the other hand, prooftheoretic approaches (Braine & O'Brian, 1991;Rips, 1983;1994) propose that people possess general inference rules and follow a kind of natural deduction strategy to derive conclusions from a set of premises.…”

Section: Classical Models Of Belief Revisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Belief change as propositional update

Elio¹

1997

Cognitive Science

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This study examines the problem of belief revision, defined as deciding which of several initially accepted sentences to disbelieve, when new information presents a logical inconsistency with the initial set. In the first three experiments, the initial sentence set included a conditional sentence, a non-conditional (ground) sentence, and an inferred conclusion drawn from the first two. The new information contradicted the inferred conclusion. Results indicated that conditional sentences were more readily abandoned than ground sentences, even when either choice would lead to a consistent belief state, and that this preference was more pronounced when problems used natural language cover stories rather than symbols. The pattern of belief revision choices differed depending on whether the contradicted conclusion from the initial belief set had been a modus ponens or modus tollens inference. Two additional experiments examined alternative model-theoretic definitions of minimal change to a belief state, using problems that contained multiple models of the initial belief state and of the new information that provided the contradiction. The results indicated that people did not follow any of four formal definitions of minimal change on these problems. The new information and the contradiction it offered was not, for example, used to select a particular model of the initial belief state as a way of reconciling the contradiction.The preferred revision was to retain only those initial sentences that had the same, unambiguous truth value within and across both the initial and new information sets. The study and results are presented in the context of certain logicbased formalizations of belief revision, syntactic and model-theoretic representations of belief states, and performance models of human deduction. Principles by which some types of sentences might be more "entrenched" than others in the face of contradiction are also discussed from the perspective of induction and theory revision.

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“…In addition, Wilson and Rutherford give us an important reminder that in Johnson-Laird's theory (e.g. Johnson-Laird et al 1992), mental models are assumed to be constructed and manipulated within working memory (WM) rather than long-term memory (LTM). As we will discuss below, the role of WM as a mental substrate for model construction is critical in distinguishing between the notion of a mental model and that of a 'conceptual model'.…”

Section: What Is a Mental Model?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been proposed in previous sections that mental models (e.g., Johnson-Laird et al 1992, Johnson-Laird 1996 and mental imagery (e.g. Narayanan and Hegarty 1998) are specific forms of internal representation that are held in WM, whilst conceptual models are primarily artifacts of long-term memory (LTM).…”

Section: The Interplay Between Ltm and Wmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internal representations, external representations and ergonomics: towards a theoretical integration

Richardson

Ball

2009

Theoretical Issues in Ergonomics Science

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Ergonomics is concerned with how humans interact with systems to perform tasks that achieve goals. This interaction requires thought processes that construct and manipulate mental representations of situations to enable the selection of task-oriented actions having predicted outcomes. The argument for a link between concepts of mental representation and the concerns of ergonomists is a critical theme in the present review, which assesses the current state of knowledge regarding the nature of mental representations and the way in which they are deployed to enable effective system interaction. Other issues that we tackle head on include: (1) the vast range of existing terminology that underpins discussions about representational constructs; (2) the important role of memory in understanding mental representation; and (3) the tight coupling between external and internal representations during task performance. We conclude by proposing a novel, explanatory framework that aims to integrate disparate notions of mental and external representation.

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Propositional reasoning by model.

Cited by 393 publications

References 45 publications

Mental models of Boolean concepts

Mental models of Boolean concepts

Belief change as propositional update

Internal representations, external representations and ergonomics: towards a theoretical integration

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