Psychologie der Schizophrenie

Berze, Josef; Gruhle, Hans W.

doi:10.1007/978-3-7091-6005-3

Cited by 95 publications

(32 citation statements)

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“…Insofar as mental activity is directly determined by the given level of consciousness, it is not associated with affect (activitas sine affectu) . As Berze [7,8,34,35,36] reiterated, disrupted-self in schizophrenia is unrelated to affection. ‘There is no one-sided primacy of affectivity before the activity' [35] (our translation).…”

Section: Berze: Reduced Tone (Hypotonia) Of Consciousness As the Corementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gruhle [8] also followed Jaspers' [1,43,44,49] emphasis concerning the interaction between developing clinical expertise and the formation of ideal types of the disorders when applying the phenomenological method to clinical experience: ‘In our general discussion of the psychology of schizophrenia, we presuppose thousands of analyses of individual cases and thereby create a kind of summary of our own clinical experience' (our translation). …”

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As Jaspers, Gruhle [8,9] advocated phenomenological rigor by resisting the assumption that one has theoretical access to a phenomenological essence of schizophrenia. He contended that it is not possible to derive all the primary symptoms of schizophrenia from a basic disturbance (Grundstörung) or psychological essence.…”

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Gruhle [8] criticized ‘those authors who seek to characterize the essence of schizophrenia with a single catchword or catchy phrase. Such researchers call this the basic disturbance ( Grundstörung ), which everyone then embraces as sounding important.…”

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These theories were meant to explain its various symptoms in terms of a unifying theoretical essence or concept. Jung (1907) [6] and then later Berze (1914) [7] and Gruhle [8,9] reviewed these theories of a putative essential core of schizophrenia. Jaspers was critical of such theories and, through his criticisms, was seen as bringing order to the field with his rigorous and systematic thinking [10,11].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Jaspers' Critique of Essentialist Theories of Schizophrenia and the Phenomenological Response

Mishara

Schwartz

2013

Psychopathology

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This contribution reviews the fin de siècle and immediately following efforts (Berze, Gross, Jung, Stransky, Weygandt, and others) to find a fundamental psychological disturbance (psychologische Grundstörung) underlying the symptoms of dementia praecox, later renamed schizophrenia by Bleuler (1908, 1911). In his General Psychopathology (1913), Jaspers brings order into the field by bringing to psychopathology a scientific basis coupled with phenomenological rigor. He was critical of theories that proposed an essence of schizophrenia, which is merely asserted verbally. This imperative is reiterated by other members of the Heidelberg School (Gruhle, Mayer-Gross, and K. Schneider). Gruhle (1929) contended that the primary symptoms of schizophrenia, indicating an underlying but still unknown neurobiological disease process, are independent from one another. They cannot be brought under a single, current theoretical model. That is, schizophrenia cannot be explained in terms of a ‘catchword', which is only thought but not empirically studied. Sobered but also inspired by Jaspers' rigor, phenomenological psychiatrists (Binswanger, Blankenburg, Conrad, Ey, and others) proposed more tempered models, which could be studied empirically or tested scientifically. This historical progression may be viewed as a dialectical process: First, bold, merely verbal assertions without method were made, then Jaspers followed with a sobering critique, and finally, the existential-phenomenological clinicians/researchers responded by producing fine-grained, rigorous phenomenological models, tempered by humility and self-critique, which led to hypotheses that could be tested in current clinical neuroscience.

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Section: Berze: Reduced Tone (Hypotonia) Of Consciousness As the Corementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Jaspers' Phenomenological Rigor: Critique Of Essentialist Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Jaspers' Critique of Essentialist Theories of Schizophrenia and the Phenomenological Response

Mishara

Schwartz

2013

Psychopathology

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Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions: A critical overview

Sass

Byrom

2015

World Psychiatry

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There is considerable overlap between phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions. In this paper, we first review major phenomenological accounts of delusions, beginning with Jaspers' ideas regarding incomprehensibility, delusional mood, and disturbed "cogito" (basic, minimal, or core self-experience) in what he termed "delusion proper" in schizophrenia. Then we discuss later studies of decontextualization and delusional mood by Matussek, changes in self and world in delusion formation according to Conrad's notions of "apophany" and "anastrophe", and the implications of ontological transformations in the felt sense of reality in some delusions. Next we consider consistencies between: a) phenomenological models stressing minimal-self (ipseity) disturbance and hyperreflexivity in schizophrenia, and b) recent neurocognitive models of delusions emphasizing salience dysregulation and prediction error. We voice reservations about homogenizing tendencies in neurocognitive explanations of delusions (the "paranoia paradigm"), given experiential variations in states of delusion. In particular we consider shortcomings of assuming that delusions necessarily or always involve "mistaken beliefs" concerning objective facts about the world. Finally, we offer some suggestions regarding possible neurocognitive factors. Current models that stress hypersalience (banal stimuli experienced as strange) might benefit from considering the potential role of hyposalience in delusion formation. Hyposalience -associated with experiencing the strange as if it were banal, and perhaps with activation of the default mode network -may underlie a kind of delusional derealization and an "anything goes" attitude. Such an attitude would be conducive to delusion formation, yet differs significantly from the hypersalience emphasized in current neurocognitive theories.

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Autonomy and Schizophrenia: Reflections on an Ideal

Sass

2010

Personality and Psychopathology

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Psychologie der Schizophrenie

Cited by 95 publications

References 0 publications

Jaspers' Critique of Essentialist Theories of Schizophrenia and the Phenomenological Response

Jaspers' Critique of Essentialist Theories of Schizophrenia and the Phenomenological Response

Phenomenological and neurocognitive perspectives on delusions: A critical overview

Autonomy and Schizophrenia: Reflections on an Ideal

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